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Brady Misconduct Remedies: Prior Jeopardy
and Ethical Discipline of Prosecutors
J. Thomas Sullivan*
In an Arkansas capital murder prosecution that resulted in
conviction and sentences of death based on the killing of a
family offour, defense counsel learned after the conviction had
been reversed that a key prosecution witness, the defendant's
son, who testified against his father, implicating him in the
murders at trial, had also given prosecutors a statement in
which he claimed responsibility for the crimes and exculpated
his father. Defense counsel moved to dismiss the prosecution on
the ground of prosecutorial misconduct, then raised a prior
jeopardy claim in an effort to bar retrial by taking an
interlocutory appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court. The court
rejected the prior jeopardy claim and permitted the retrial to
proceed, while referring the prosecutors involved to the
Committee on Professional Conduct for consideration of
possible ethical violations. On retrial, the defendant was again
convicted, although his son did not testify against him at this
proceeding. This article examines issues of prosecutorial
misconduct in this case and remedies for misconduct.
I. THE BILLY DALE GREEN CAPITAL MURDER CASE
When Billy Dale Green was first sentenced to death for the
capital murders of four members of an Arkansas family in 2004,
one of the prosecution's key witnesses was his son, Chad.'
Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School
of Law.
1. See Green v. State, 365 Ark. 478, 483-84, 231 S.W.3d 638, 644-45 (2006)
[hereinafter Green I]. Defendant appealed and, in 2006, the Arkansas Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the case back to the circuit court for a new trial. Id. at 482-83, 231
S.W.3d at 643-44. Green was again convicted on all four charges and, in 2011, he again
appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court, which affirmed his convictions. Green v. State,
2011 Ark. 92, at 1, 380 S.W.3d 368, 369 [hereinafter Green II]. In 2013, he appealed once
more to the Arkansas Supreme Court. Green v. State, 2013 Ark. 497, 430 S.W.3d 729
[hereinafter Green III]. For clarity, as the brackets indicate, this article will refer to the
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2Chad was charged as an accomplice to the murder. Having
pleaded uilty to a reduced charge in return for a twenty-year
sentence, Chad testified that he and his father smoked
methamphetamine together before his father killed the entire
family, apparently motivated by the alleged theft of ten
marijuana plants from Green by Carl Elliott, the father of the
family.4 On direct appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed
the convictions and death sentences on the four capital counts
and remanded the case for a new trial based on improper
admission of reputation evidence at trial.5 In light of the
evidence summarized by the Arkansas Supreme Court in
reviewing Green's conviction and death sentence, 6 the propriety
of capital punishment on these facts could hardly be questioned
unless, of course, Green did not actually commit those four
heinous murders.7
Arkansas Supreme Court decision from 2006 as "Green I," from 2011 as "Green II," and
from 2013 as "Green III."
2. Green III, 2013 Ark. at 2,430 S.W.3d at 735.
3. Id.
4. Green I, 365 Ark. at 488-89,231 S.W.3d at 644-45, 648.
5. Id. at 483, 231 S.W.3d at 643-44. The court's review of capital sentences
expressly includes review of unpreserved error pursuant to Rule 10 of the Arkansas Rules
of Appellate Procedure-Criminal. Id. at 492-93, 231 S.W.3d at 650. Pursuant to Rule 10,
the court is required to consider, inter alia:
(iv) whether the trial court failed in its obligation to intervene without
objection to correct a serious error by admonition or declaring a mistrial;
(v) whether the trial court erred in failing to take notice of an evidentiary
error that affected a substantial fight of the defendant.
Id. at 493, 231 S.W.3d at 650-51.
The court remanded because the admission of the reputation evidence violated
Green's right to a fair trial. Id. at 483, 231 S.W.3d at 643-44. Arkansas generally does not,
however, recognize claims of unpreserved error as plain or fundamental error. See, e.g.,
Buckley v. State, 349 Ark. 53, 65, S.W.3d 825, 832 (2002) ("[I]n Arkansas, an argument
for reversal will not be considered in the absence of an appropriate objection."). But the
Arkansas Supreme Court has also excused procedural default occurring in a death sentence
case because of the perceived severity and finality of death. See Howard v. State, 366 Ark.
453, 455, 236 S.W.3d 508, 509 (2006) (granting leave to file amended petition for post-
conviction relief in compliance with the rle requiring petitioner's verification by personal
signature because petitioner was sentenced to death).
6. Green I, 365 Ark. at 487-88, 231 S.W.3d at 647-48.
7. In Green III, the majority upheld Green's conviction on all four counts of capital
murder. Green II, 2013 Ark. 497, at 39-40, 430 S.W.3d at 754. Then-Chief Justice
Hannah, joined by Justices Corbin and Danielson, dissented in part, stating that the
evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support Green's conviction on three of the
four murder counts. Id. at 40, 430 S.W.3d at 754 (Hannah, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
BRADY MISCONDUCT REMEDIES
Chad Green's testimony was particularly important
because, as an accomplice to the murders, his testimony required
corroboration under Arkansas law.8  Much of the State's most
compelling corroborating evidence was elicited from Scott
Moffitt, Billy Green's cellmate in the county jail.9 Moffitt
testified about Green's admissions made to him while in custody
concerning the murder and his extensive efforts to cover up the
crime, including cleaning an impounded car, hiding the .22 rifle
used in the killings, scattering the body parts of the little girl,
and burning his own clothes.' Moffitt also testified that Green
explained his motive after saying he should not have killed the
family: "If you don't pay the dope man, your ass is took
down." 1
On appeal, Green's counsel argued that Moffitt's testimony
should have been scrutinized more strictly based on his status as
a "jailhouse snitch," but the court rejected the argument because
it had not been preserved by objection or requested instruction at
trial. 12  The court noted that "[t]he State did not offer Moffitt
leniency in exchange for his testimony.' 3  Traditionally, of
course, the testimony of jailhouse informants, like that of
accomplices, is considered highly dubious-precisely because
of the likelihood that the informant may fabricate the
information in order to obtain favorable treatment or in
retaliation against the claimed declarant.14
8. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-89-111 (e)(1) (Supp. 2013) provides:
(A) A conviction ... cannot be had in any case of felony upon the testimony
of an accomplice ... unless corroborated by other evidence tending to
connect the defendant... with the commission of the offense.
(B) The corroboration under subdivision (e)(1)(A) of this section is not
sufficient if it merely shows that the offense was committed and the
circumstances of the offense.
9. Green I, 365 Ark. at 489, 231 S.W.3d at 648.
10. Id. at 489-90, 231 S.W.3d at 648.
11. Id. at 490, 231 S.W.3d at 648.
12. Id. at 485, 231 S.W.3d at 645. Another informant, Phillip Shockey, also testified
that Green admitted killing Felicia Elliott. Green 111, 2013 Ark. 497, at 4, 430 S.W.3d at
736.
13. Green 1, 365 Ark. at 489 n.5, 231 S.W.3d at 648 n.5.
14. See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 139 (1999) (assessing reliability of
accomplice's statement to police incriminating accused in terms of the "natural motive for
him to attempt to exculpate himself as much as possible") (emphasis added); see also Dodd
v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 784 (Okla. 2000) (adopting mandatory procedure in state criminal
trials for evaluating credibility of jailhouse-informant testimony relating to admissions
purportedly made by accused while in custody). In Myers v. State, 133 P.3d 312 (Okla.
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The Green trilogy would be rather straightforward were it
not for the fact that, following the reversal of the conviction and
remand for new trial, another development cast even more doubt
on the reliability of Chad Green's testimony. Following
remand, defense counsel learned that Green not only provided
authorities with statements incriminating his father in the
commission of the four capital murders, but also made another
statement in the possession of the State in which he fully
exculpated his father and solely implicated himself in the
crimes. 15  The prosecuting attorneys did not disclose this
exculpatory statement to the defense prior to Green's capital
trial.1 When the nondisclosure was brought to the attention of
the Arkansas Supreme Court, it noted that both parties agreed
that the nondisclosure violated the prosecution's duty under
Brady v. Maryland, the landmark United States Supreme Court
case regarding the accused's due process right to be made aware
of exculpatory evidence. 17
Green's counsel petitioned for relief upon discovering the
prosecutor's violation of the disclosure duty.' 8 He moved to bar
Crim. App. 2006), the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals explained that the procedure
adopted in Dodd was designed to expand evaluation of the jailhouse informant's
credibility, but did not require exclusion of this testimony:
Nothing in Dodd requires the trial court to exclude a jailhouse informant's
testimony because his or her testimony is inconsistent, unbelievable, or self-
serving. The point of Dodd was to require more thorough examination of
informant evidence and complete and full disclosure of information relating
to an informant's motivation to fabricate testimony. In this case, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the witness to testify. Any
conflict or inconsistency in the witness's testimony goes to the weight and
credibility of that testimony and are issues properly addressed on cross-
examination.
Id. at 321.
15. Green II, 2011 Ark. 92, at 2,380 S.W.3d 368, 370.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 4, 380 S.W.3d at 371 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)).
The court found:
[I]n the statement discovered by the defense, given prior to appellant's trial,
Chad confessed that he alone committed the murders and never implicated
his father .... Appellant was not given a copy of this statement prior to or
during the first trial, even though his attorneys sought full discovery from the
State. Appellant asserted that having the opportunity to cross-examine Chad
regarding the statement would have substantially changed the outcome of
appellant's trial.
Id. at 2-3, 380 S.W.3d at 370.
18. Id. at 1, 380 S.w.3d at 369-70.
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retrial based on the Double Jeopardy Clause, arguing that the
prosecutor's misconduct contributing to the conviction should
bar retrial. 19 The court rejected his double jeopardy claim based
on its earlier remand for a new trial,2 ° illustrating one of the
major problems in the enforcement of the State's federally
protected disclosure duty.
II. THE PROSECUTION'S CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO
DISCLOSE EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENSE
The prosecution's failure to disclose Chad Green's
statement inculpating himself and exculpating his father is
precisely the type of misconduct that Brady and its progeny
were designed to prevent.2' Brady requires the disclosure of
exculpatory evidence that is material to the accused's guilt or
punishment.22  In Brady, the undisclosed evidence was co-
defendant Boblit's confession that he, not Brady, actually killed
the victim in the capital murder prosecution. 23  There was a
reasonable probability that Boblit's admission would have led to
imposition of a life sentence rather than the death penalty for
Brady, and thus, the Court upheld the Maryland court's
conclusion that failure to disclose the confession to Brady's
counsel violated due process.
24
Brady's requirement for disclosure of exculpatory evidence
extends beyond discovery of evidence that would necessarily
establish the accused's innocence by showing that he could not
19. Green I1, 2011 Ark. 92, at 3, 380 S.W.3d at 369-70.
20. Id. at 12, 380 S.W.3d at 375.
21. For a thorough discussion of the Supreme Court's decisions relating to disclosure
duties prior to Brady v. Maryland and subsequent decisions expanding upon Brady, see J.
Thomas Sullivan, Brady-Based Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims, Buckley, and the
Arkansas Coram Nobis Remedy, 64 ARK. L. REV. 561, 562-81 (2011).
22. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963). The disclosure duty is
incorporated in Arkansas's ethical rules governing attorney conduct, which require, in
relevant part, that the prosecuting attorney:
make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known
to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the
offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the
tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor,
except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective
order of the tribunal ....
ARK. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8(d).
23. Brady, 373 U.S. at 84.
24. Id. at 86.
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have committed the crime, or that someone else did, in fact,
commit the offense. In Giles v. Maryland, the Court concluded
that failure to disclose prior inconsistencies in the statements
given by the complainant warranted remand.25 Giles was
convicted of rape after testifying that the complainant consented
to sex, but warned him that she would have to claim rape if their
sexual encounter was discovered because she was on probation
and "in trouble"-a claim that led the state appellate court to
observe that the credibility of the witnesses was an important
factor in the conviction. 26 The Court reviewed evidence in the
record showing that the complainant had a significant history of
promiscuity and of making false allegations of rape, including
recanting a claimed rape by two men charged on the basis of her
initial statements to law enforcement officers after being
confined in a hospital psychiatric ward following a suicide
attempt.27
The undisclosed evidence also included prior statements
from the complainant and the boy she was with on the night of
the alleged assault in which they told officers that they were
engaging in sex when Giles and two other men approached their
parked vehicle. 28 At trial, they testified that they were merely
sitting in the back seat of the car when the others approached.
Given the particular nature of the undisclosed information
concerning the complainant's history and admission of previous
false claims of rape, the undisclosed prior inconsistent
statements she had given were likely far more relevant because
of the consent defense raised at trial, even despite the fact that
fanciful consent claims are not uncommon in rape
prosecutions. 30  The inconsistent statements in Giles are
especially significant because they involve the circumstances of
the offense itself and the credibility of the complaining witness,
as the Court explained: "[T]o the extent credibility could have
been effectively attacked in this case, resolution of the issue of
consent necessarily would have been affected since it turned
wholly on credibility.,
31
25. 386 U.S. 66, 77-79 (1967).
26. Id. at 69-70.
27. Id. at 70.
28. Id. at 74-75.
29. Id. at 75.




The Giles plurality, however, did not resolve the questions
of factual credibility or prejudice. Having examined the entire
record, including information not previously available to the
state court, the Court remanded the case for consideration of the
scope of the disclosure duty applicable to the evidence not
provided to trial counsel and determination of prejudice to
Giles's right to due process.
32
The Court's post-Giles decisions reflect less hesitance to
affirm the prosecution's duty to disclose evidence usable at trial
to impeach its witnesses. Commonly, nondisclosure involves
potential sources of bias, such as the circumstances under which
the prosecution's witness has been induced to testify.
Particularly common in these situations is the existence of an
undisclosed agreement or denial of an agreement by which the
witness can expect to better his own situation in some way in
return for testifying against the accused at trial. In Giglio v.
United States, for instance, the Court held that the prosecutor
was required to disclose any plea-bargain agreement or
agreement otherwise promising leniency contingent on the
witness's testimony against the accused.33
Later, in United States v. Bagley, the Court addressed the
general significance of impeachment evidence, 34 expanding
upon Giglio and United States v. Agurs, in which the
undisclosed evidence was the victim's prior conviction for
assault that the defense argued was relevant to the issue of self
defense.35 In more broadly holding that any impeachment
evidence, if material, must be disclosed to the defense for use at
trial, the Bagley Court effectively recognized that the disclosure
duty applies not only to evidence showing or suggesting the
accused's innocence or reduced culpability, but also to other
32. Id. at 80-81.
33 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972).
34. 473 U.S. 667, 675-76 (1985).
35. 427 U.S. 97, 100 (1976). The most important aspect of the Court's decision in
Agurs is its holding that disclosure of favorable evidence is mandatory and not contingent
on a request for disclosure by the defense, recognizing that, "[iln many cases, however,
exculpatory information in the possession of the prosecutor may be unknown to defense
counsel." Id. at 106-07. The Court rejected the alleged prejudice from nondisclosure of
the victim's prior conviction because, as the Court noted, the victim was armed at the time
of the attack and Agurs had no defensive wounds. Id. at 113-14. Thus, the uncontroverted
evidence that the victim was armed with a knife rendered the evidence of the prior
conviction cumulative, adding nothing substantial to the defense theory that Agurs killed in
self-defense.
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favorable evidence that simply casts doubt on the credibility of
the prosecution's case.36 Bagley, like Giglio, involved a failure
to disclose the full extent of agreements made with a testifying
witness supplying key trial evidence.
37
Brady, as extended by Bagley, effectively encompasses
claims that would support the defendant's factual innocence or
legal innocence.38  The standard for determining whether
disclosure is required focuses on the "materiality" of the
impeachment evidence suppressed or inadvertently not
disclosed. 39  Not all potentially impeaching evidence is
necessarily material in light of the prosecution's theory of the
case; similarly, not all nondisclosures will require relief when
the likely effect of nondisclosure is insignificant.40  The Bagley
Court thus reaffirmed that the materiality of impeachment
evidence determines whether nondisclosure constitutes a due
process violation.41 It concluded that "evidence is material only
if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different," and then explained that "ra] 'reasonable
probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome."4
36. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676-78.
37. Id. at 671-72. On the questionable ethical basis for use of agreements in which
the benefit for the testifying witness depends on the "quality" or usefulness of the
testimony, see Samuel A. Perroni & Janey McNutt, Criminal Contingency Fee
Arrangements: How Fair are They?, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 211 (1994); see also
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 1994). In Buckley, the Seventh Circuit
observed:
The exchange of money for information may be a regrettable way of securing
evidence, but it is common. So too with promises to go easy (the complaint
alleges that a prosecutor implied that Cruz and Hemandez might escape the
death penalty by talking freely). Buckley does not cite any case holding that
this practice violates the Constitution. Concealing the payments at trial
would have violated his rights; a defendant is entitled to know what the
prosecutor paid for a statement (whether in cash or in lenience and related
promises) so that he may expose to the jury the witness's shortcomings and
bias.... His contention that the payments themselves violate the due process
clause does not state a claim on which relief may be granted.
Buckley, 20 F.3d at 794 (citations omitted).
38. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 674-78.
39. Id. at 678-83.
40. See id at 682.
41. Id. at 678.
42. Id. at 682.
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In Kyles v. Whitlev, the Court confirmed that the Brady
disclosure duty has developed over thirty years through various
decisions.43 Significant among the summary conclusions of the
Kyles Court are:
The requirement that the defendant demonstrate only
that the nondisclosure of material subject to the duty
showed a reasonable probability that, but-for the
nondisclosure, the outcome of the proceedings would be
favorable. The defendant is not required to prove that he
would have been acquitted had the required disclosure been
made; 44
There is no requirement for proof of prosecutorial bad
faith or deliberate intent to violate the accused's rights
because the due process issue concerns only the
defendant's ability to respond to the prosecution's case and
not the culpability of the prosecutor in not making a
required disclosure;
45
Evidence subject to the disclosure duty may be
exculpatory-disproving defendant's guilt-or
impeaching-casting doubt on the credibility of the
prosecution's case;
4
The disclosure duty is not dependent upon a specific
request for discovery by the defense;
47
The actions of law enforcement officers and
investigators, in failing to disclose the existence of
favorable evidence to the prosecuting attorney, are imputed
to the prosecutor, as members of the prosecution team;
43. 514 U.S. 419,432-38(1995).
44. Id. at 434 (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985)).
45. Id. at 432. The Kyles Court traced the rule directly to Brady, noting that it held
there "that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id. (quoting Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)).
46. Id. at 433 (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985)).
47. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433 (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976)).
48. Id. at 437-38. Arkansas expressly adopted this approach even prior to the 1995
decision in Kyles. See Lewis v. State, 286 Ark. 372, 375, 691 S.W.2d 864, 865 (1985);
Williams v. State, 267 Ark. 527, 531, 593 S.W.2d 8, 10 (1980).
2016] 1019
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The prosecutor has the responsibility of determining
whether evidence in the possession of the prosecution is, in
fact, favorable and subject to disclosure; 49
Where multiple instances of nondisclosure are shown,
they are to be assessed cumulatively in determining
whether the nondisclosures meet the reasonable probability
standard.5 °
The failure to disclose the exculpatory and clearly
inconsistent prior statement in Green highlights the most salient
point in the Court's Brady jurisprudence when the actions of the
prosecutor are directly called into question. The motivation or
bad faith of the individual prosecutor in failing to disclose
favorable evidence to the defense is typically not an element of
the due process claim because the issue focuses on the
likelihood that the nondisclosure has prejudiced the defendant.51
The damage done to the defense occurs irrespective of the
prosecutor's intent, assuming that the accused can demonstrate
that disclosure could reasonably have resulted in a likelihood
that he would have obtained a more favorable result in the
proceedings.52  The violation is predicated on likelihood of
injury to the accused, rather than the need for sanctions to
promote compliance with the disclosure obligation.53
49. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 (stating that "the prosecution, which alone can know what
is undisclosed, must be assigned the consequent responsibility to gauge the likely net effect
of all such evidence and make disclosure when the point of 'reasonable probability' is
reached").
50. Id. at 436-37 (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985)).
51. E.g., Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547 (2004) (per curiam) (citing United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976)); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (stating that
"when the State suppresses or fails to disclose material exculpatory evidence, the good or
bad faith of the prosecution is irrelevant: a due process violation occurs whenever such
evidence is withheld").
52. See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976). In Agurs, the Court
reiterated the focus of its concern for due process: "If the suppression of evidence results
in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the character of the
prosecutor." Id.
53. See id; see also Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (stating the principle underlying
mandatory disclosure of favorable evidence is "not punishment of society for misdeeds of a
prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Society wins not only when the
guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair"). As noted earlier, the Agurs Court
observed that in many cases, "exculpatory information in the possession of the prosecutor
may be unknown to defense counsel." Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110. This observation seems
almost unnecessary, of course, since if the information is actually known to defense
counsel, there would be no need for disclosure and, consequently, no violation for failure to
disclose. But the existence of the evidence might well be known, yet without complete
BRADY MISCONDUCT REMEDIES
Green reflects a more significant violation of due process
than Brady, even though both involved a failure to disclose the
incriminating statement of an accomplice co-defendant that
would have cast the accused in a more favorable light before the
capital trial jury.54 In Brady, co-defendant Boblit admitted that
he committed the murder, and this statement was withheld from
the defense by the prosecution. 55  This statement, though
favorable to the defendant, did not completely exonerate him;
Brady remained culpable in the commission of the underlying
felony and, thus, the capital felony murder.56
In contrast, in Green, the State used the son's testimony at
trial to incriminate his father while his prior statement-
undisclosed--completely exonerated the father in the
commission of the capital crimes. 57 Not only did the State fail
to disclose the exculpatory statement, but its negotiated
agreement with the son was a critical component of its case; the
State proceeded to trial without ever admitting its own
58knowledge of the accused's innocence.
III. REMEDIES FOR BRADYMISCONDUCT IN LIGHT
OF GREEN
In limited circumstances, tort remedies are available for
official misconduct that violates civil rights protected by
federal59 or state law, 60 or by basic common law principles in the
disclosure, defense counsel might be compromised by her inability to use the exculpatory
evidence for further investigation, or unable to lay a foundation necessary for its admission
at trial.
54. Compare Brady, 373 U.S. at 84 (discussing a defendant's admission to
participating in the underlying crime, and the prosecution's nondisclosure of a co-
defendant's admission that he committed the actual homicide), with Green II, 2011 Ark.
92, at 2-3, 380 S.W.3d 368, 370-71 (discussing the prosecution's nondisclosure of a
witness's admission that he committed murder, and that defendant took no part in the
crime).
55. Brady, 373 U.S. at 84.
56. Id.
57. Green II, 2011 Ark. 92, at 2,380 S.W.3d at 370.
58. Id.
59. E.g., Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012) (waiving sovereign
immunity for torts claims brought against the United States); Federal Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
2016] 1021
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absence of statutory protection. 61  However, while civil rights
litigation can be potentially productive for redressing violations
of individual rights by state actors, the absolute immunity of
prosecutors engaged in the prosecutorial function shields them
from virtually any civil liability for Brady-based misconduct.62
In lmbler v. Pachtman, the Court applied the immunity doctrine
to bar recovery in a civil suit alleging that the prosecutor in a
capital murder trial had knowingly relied on misleading or false
evidence in obtaining the conviction and death sentence.63
Imbler eventually obtained habeas relief on his misconduct
claim, 64  and then brought a Section 198365 action against
Pachtman, the prosecutor who voluntarily disclosed evidence
developed after the trial and appeal which casted doubt on the
credibility of the state's key fact witness at Imbler's trial.66
The doctrine of absolute immunity for prosecutors
engaging in the prosecution function insulates prosecutors from
civil liability for even egregious acts of misconduct, such as
deliberate suppression of evidence clearly exculpating an
accused.67  For instance, in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, the Court
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
60. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-105(a) (Repl. 2006), for example, provides:
(a) Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of this state or any of its political subdivisions subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Arkansas
Constitution shall be liable to the party injured in an action in circuit court for
legal and equitable relief or other proper redress.
61. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971) (establishing the common law right to sue a federal official in federal court for
constitutional violations).
62. See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady
Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REv. 693, 704 (1987).
63. 424 U.S. 409,410,416 (1976).
64. Id. at 415; see also Imbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795, 812 (C.D. Cal. 1969),
aff'd, Imbler v. California, 424 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1970) (granting habeas relief). Imbler's
death sentence for capital murder had earlier been vacated in another post-conviction
proceeding. In re Imbler, 393 P.2d 687, 688 (Cal. 1964) (en banc).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
66. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 412-13.
67. Arkansas has adopted the doctrine of absolute immunity for the prosecutor's
performance of duties associated or arising from the prosecution of criminal cases.
Culpepper v. Smith, 302 Ark. 558, 572, 792 S.W.2d 293, 300 (1990). However, the
doctrine is limited to only those functions and not, for instance, where the prosecutor
1022
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affirmed the applicability of the doctrine to actions during the
actual prosecution process, while limiting the immunity theory
to qualified immunity for other actions by prosecutors, such as
in making statements to the press.6 8 In Buckley, the defendant
was effectively exonerated on a capital murder charge when
prosecutors used unreliable forensic testimony to match the
defendant's footprint with one recovered from the murder
scene. 69  The Court concluded that the involvement of
prosecutors in obtaining the questionable expert opinion,
predating the indictment against Buckley, would not qualify for
absolute immunity, but they might nevertheless be entitled to the
qualified immunity provided to all public officials. 7' The net
result of the litigation was the Seventh Circuit's conclusion on
remand that prosecutorial misconduct in the course of the actual
prosecution of the case would receive absolute immunity,
apparently including even the knowing use of perjured
testimony to obtain a conviction.
71
A. Green's Double Jeopardy Claim
In response to the discovery of Chad Green's previously
undisclosed statement that completely contradicted his trial
testimony, defense counsel sought relief from the retrial ordered
by the Arkansas Supreme Court by filing a motion to dismiss the
pending capital charges based upon prior jeopardy protection.72
swears to an affidavit in a fashion similar to a witness. Newton v. Etoch, 332 Ark. 325,
338-39, 965 S.W.2d 96, 102-03 (1998).
68. 509 U.S. 259, 269-70, 276-78 (1993).
69. Id. at 262.
70. The Court explained:
[T]he prosecutors' conduct occurred well before they could properly claim
to be acting as advocates. Respondents have not cited any authority that
supports an argument that a prosecutor's fabrication of false evidence during
the preliminary investigation of an unsolved crime was immune from liability
at common law, either in 1871 or at any date before the enactment of § 1983.
It therefore remains protected only by qualified immunity.
Id. at 275 (emphasis added).
In contrast, the prosecutors in Green did not disclose to defense counsel the prior
inconsistent statement of Chad Green, exculpating his father, until after the case against
Billy Dale Green had been filed. Green II, 2011 Ark. 92, at 2, 380 S.W.3d 368, 370.
71. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789, 794 (7th Cir. 1994) ("But Buckley does
not allege concealment [of an agreement by the Government to pay for witness testimony]
at trial, which would in any event be comfortably within the scope of absolute prosecutorial
immunity ... ").
72. Green H, 2011 Ark. 92, at 2-3, 380 S.W.3d at 370.
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Counsel argued that the prosecution's failure to disclose Chad
Green's prior inconsistent statement critical to impeach his trial
testimony was such an egregious violation that the defendant
should not be subject to retrial.73 Arguably, of course, Billy
Dale Green might have been acquitted had jurors concluded that
the prosecution's entire case was based on Chad Green's self-
interest in accusing his father of a murder that he, himself, had
committed, and testimony from other witnesses whose self-
interest or antagonism toward Green would lead them to falsely
accuse him. Viewed in this light, Billy Dale Green was
effectively deprived of an opportunity for acquittal that would
have freed him finally from jeopardy.
A second, and more subtle, consideration for applying
double jeopardy protection in circumstances such as these
addresses the integrity of the criminal process, rather than
speculating on the potential acquittal-or life sentences, rather
than death-that might have resulted had the defense been able
to use Chad Green's prior, inconsistent, and self-inculpatory
statement to impeach his trial testimony. Here, the overriding
concern lies in protecting individuals from oppressive tactics
used by the State, through its prosecuting attorneys, in order to
obtain convictions, especially for particularly heinous criminal
acts. Similarly, unethical or unfair prosecution tactics should
not be tolerated simply because the accused's character or prior
history of bad or violent acts, or advocacy of unpopular beliefs
or positions, may contribute to that misconduct.
74
A third consideration is that underlying the Supreme
Court's decision in Abney v. United States-the stress felt by the
accused while awaiting disposition of a criminal charge.75 This
73. Id. at 2, 380 S.W.3d at 370.
74. By analogy, in Von Moltke v. Gillies, the Court applied the constitutional right to
assistance of counsel for a German defendant charged with espionage during World War II,
holding that "[tihis Court has been particularly solicitous to see that this right was carefully
preserved where the accused was ignorant and uneducated, was kept under close
surveillance, and was the object of widespread public hostility." 332 U.S. 708, 720 (1948).
In granting relief, the majority pointed to the need to protect the right to counsel, "even
though the accused may be a member of an unpopular or hated group, or may be charged
with an offense which is peculiarly abhorrent." Id. at 726.
75. 431 U.S. 651, 661 (1977) ("[T]he guarantee against double jeopardy assures an
individual that, among other things, he will not be forced, with certain exceptions, to
endure the personal strain, public embarrassment, and expense of a criminal trial more than
once for the same offense. It thus protects interests wholly unrelated to the propriety of
any subsequent conviction.").
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is a particularly important factor warranting against twice being
tried, not simply convicted multiple times,76 or convicted after
being acquitted, or being subjected to repeated prosecutions or
trials resulting in inconsistent verdicts.
78
B. Federal Double Jeopardy Protection in Light of Oregon
v. Kennedy
Because Billy Dale Green had already obtained a new trial
as a result of the court's reversal of his conviction and sentences
due to the admission of inadmissible evidence of his reputation
for violence, he was afforded the most basic relief required for
redress of a Brady violation.79  Despite the Supreme Court's
obvious concern for the stress suffered by defendants, 80 it has
only viewed prosecutor or police misconduct as warranting
double jeopardy protection to bar further prosecution in one
instance. In Oregon v. Kennedy, the Court held that when the
prosecution goads the defense into moving for mistrial through
deliberate and repeated misconduct, the mistrial, if granted, does
76. Conviction on a greater offense bars retrial on lesser-included offenses. See
Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 682 (1977) (per curiam); see also Payne v. Virginia,
468 U.S. 1062 (1984) (per curiam) (conviction for felony murder bars retrial for an
underlying felony); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977) (conviction on a lesser-
included offense bars successive prosecution for a greater offense when the facts necessary
to prove the greater-included offense were the same as those of the lesser-included
offense).
77. An acquittal terminates jeopardy on the charges tried. An acquittal may occur by
court decree or jury verdict, as in Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 466-67 (2005), or
where a trial is terminated because of lack of evidence, as in United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 565-66 (1977), or where a conviction is reversed on appeal due
to insufficient evidence, as in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978) and Greene v.
Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 24 (1978) (applying Burks). The double jeopardy protection afforded
by the Fifth Amendment was made applicable in state prosecutions in Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1969). Prior to that, a state-court defendant acquitted at trial could
be retried and convicted without protection from multiple prosecutions. Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 321-22 (1937). Palko was convicted of second-degree murder,
an implicit acquittal on the charge of first-degree murder, at his first trial. Id. at 320-21.
78. See Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366, 368-70 (1972) (per curiam) (showing that
acquittal on the greater offense of murder bars subsequent prosecution for an included
offense of robbery where acquittal is based on a fact issue common to both charges); Ashe
v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443-47 (1970) (noting the collateral estoppel doctrine bars
successive prosecutions following acquittal on a common issue of fact).
79. Green II, 2011 Ark. 92, at 1-2, 380 S.W.3d 368, 369-70.
80. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661-62 (1977).
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trigger the bar.81 The majority rejected the argument that other
misconduct requires similar treatment.
82
The Court's very limited application of the prior jeopardy
bar in Oregon v. Kennedy effectively barred Green's reliance on
83the double jeopardy protection. Since a motion for mistrial
typically involves waiver of the prior jeopardy claim when made
by the accused,84 the Court's exception in Kennedy addressed
the rare situation in which the motion made by the accused can
be traced to deliberate action by the prosecution designed to
force termination of the proceedings had the State, itself, moved
for mistrial.85 But mistrial made on motion of the accused may
result from repeated, egregious action by the prosecution that is
so prejudicial to the accused's right to fair trial that the trial
court's rulings could not effectively protect him from the
prosecutor's misconduct. 86  The Kennedy majority, however,
refused to endorse an extension of double jeopardy protection to
cover such situations, finding there were no standards by which
courts could be guided in determining when prosecutorial• 87
misconduct warrants barring further proceedings. Justice
81. 456 U.S. 667, 675-76 (1982).
82. Id.
83. Green 11, 2011 Ark. 92, at 9-12, 380 S.W.3d at 373-75.
84. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 672.
85. Id. at 675-76. In such circumstances, the Court's concern is that the prosecution
has goaded the accused into moving for mistrial out of fear that the jury will acquit. See
United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463,
468 n.3 (1964). In general, mistrial granted on the State's motion bars further proceedings
unless manifestly necessary for the mistrial. Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 606-07. Although the trial
court has discretion to order mistrial, the improvident exercise of that discretion based on
misunderstanding of controlling legal principles may trigger the protection afforded by
constitutional protection against double jeopardy. E.g., Jaynes v. State, 66 Ark. App. 43,
47-48, 987 S.W.2d 751, 754 (1999) ("[A] manifestly incorrect decision to grant a mistrial
will bar subsequent prosecution."). In Jaynes, the Arkansas Court of Appeals applied the
prior jeopardy doctrine where the trial court ordered a mistrial based on the State's
objection to defense counsel's opening statement that included counsel's reference to the
anticipated evidence that would be offered at trial. Id. at 44-45, 48, 987 S.W.3d at 752-54.
The Arkansas Court of Appeals agreed that mistrial had been improvidently ordered and
that a retrial of Jaynes on the same charge violated the protection against prior or double
jeopardy. Id. at 48, 987 S.W.2d at 754.
86. E.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 85 (1935) ("The trial judge, it is true,
sustained objections to some of the questions, insinuations and misstatements, and
instructed the jury to disregard them. But the situation was one which called for stem
rebuke and repressive measures and, perhaps, if these were not successful, for the granting
of a mistrial. It is impossible to say that the evil influence upon the jury of these acts of
misconduct was removed by such mild judicial action as was taken.").
87. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S 667, 674-75 (1982).
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Stevens, dissenting, argued for a more expansive view of the
protection:
A broader objection to the Court's limitation of the
exception is that the rationale for the exception extends
beyond the situation in which the prosecutor intends to
provoke a mistrial. There are other situations in which the
defendant's double jeopardy interests outweigh society's
interest in obtaining a judgment on the merits even though
the defendant has moved for a mistrial. For example, a
prosecutor may be interested in putting the defendant
through the embarrassment, expense, and ordeal of criminal
proceedings even if he cannot obtain a conviction. In such
a case, with the purpose of harassing the defendant the
prosecutor may commit repeated prejudicial errors and be
indifferent between a mistrial or mistrials and an
unsustainable conviction or convictions. Another example
is when the prosecutor seeks to inject enough unfair
prejudice into the trial to ensure a conviction but not so
much as to cause a reversal of that conviction. This kind of
overreaching would not be covered by the Court's standard
because, by hypothesis, the prosecutor's intent is to obtain a
conviction, not to provoke a mistrial. Yet the defendant's
choice-to continue the tainted proceeding or to abort it
and begin anew-can be just as "hollow" in this situation
as when the prosecutor intends to provoke a mistrial. 88
In moving for relief for the prosecution's failure to disclose
Chad Green's statement exculpating his father, Green's counsel
on interlocutory appeal sought to expand upon the relief
provided by Oregon v. Kennedy.89  While not expressly
advancing state constitutional law in support of the prior
jeopardy claims, Green's counsel offered significant decisions
from other jurisdictions in arguing for a bar to retrial. 90 In
addressing the double jeopardy claim, the Arkansas Supreme
Court noted Green's reliance on decisions from state courts in
Arizona, Hawaii, New Mexico, Oregon, and Pennsylvania, in
which the basis for the prior jeopardy bar had been extended
beyond the doctrinal confines of Oregon v. Kennedy, including
88. Id. at 689 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
89. Green 11, 2011 Ark 92, at 2-3, 380 S.W.3d 368, 370.
90. Id. at4-5, 380 S.W.3d at 371.
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the Oregon Supreme Court's decision on remand from the
Supreme Court in Kennedy.91
C. State Constitutional Double Jeopardy Protection
On remand from the Supreme Court's decision in Oregon
v. Kennedy, the Oregon Supreme Court engaged in a lengthy
analysis of the proper application of state constitutional law.
The court addressed arguments that certain state constitutional
protections are, in some instances, more expansive than those
afforded by the federal constitution. 93  Then, addressing the
scope of the protection afforded individuals by the Oregon
provision barring successive prosecutions in light of the
jeopardy principle, the court concluded:
[A] retrial is barred by article I, section 12, of the
Oregon Constitution when improper official conduct is so
prejudicial to the defendant that it cannot be cured by
means short of a mistrial, and if the official knows that the
conduct is improper and prejudicial and either intends or is
indifferent to the resulting mistrial or reversal. When this
occurs, it is clear that the burden of a second trial is not
attributable to the defendant's preference for a new trial
over completing the trial infected by an error. Rather, it
results from the state's readiness, though perhaps not
calculated intent, to force the defendant to such a choice.
94
D. Expanded Double Jeopardy Protection Under the
Arkansas Constitution?
Green's counsel cited to decisions from other jurisdictions
that expanded upon the protection against double jeopardy in an
attempt to influence the Arkansas Supreme Court to do the
91. Id at4-6, 380 S.W.3dat 371.
92. State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1322-26 (Or. 1983). Oregon has traditionally
been one of the most active jurisdictions in the development of state constitutional law.
The activist approach taken by the Oregon Supreme Court has generated a substantial body
of scholarly comment addressing the impact of its decisions. See, for example, Hans A.
Linde, What is a Constitution, What is Not, and Why Does it Matter?, 87 OR. L. REv. 717
(2008), authored by a former Oregon Supreme Court Justice who was at the forefront of
much of the development of state constitutional law theory. See also Jack L. Landau, Of
Lessons Learned and Lessons Nearly Lost: The Linde Legacy and Oregon Constitutional
Law, 43 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 251 (2007) (documenting Justice Linde's contributions to
the development of Oregon constitutional law).
93. Kennedy, 666 P.2d at 1322-26.
94. Id. at 1326.
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same.95  However, in arguing for this more expansive
interpretation, Green's counsel apparently did not advance a
separate argument phrased in terms of the double jeopardy
protection afforded by the state constitution. 96  Nevertheless,
two different sources of support for a more expansive reading of
the state constitution were relevant to the disposition of the
claim. First, the Arkansas Supreme Court developed state
constitutional law theory in the recent past,97 expanding, for
instance, upon federal constitutional protections afforded
criminal defendants. 98  Second, Arkansas law already afforded
95. For a general discussion of the use of the Arkansas Constitution in developing a
theory of state law that may afford defendants greater protection than that afforded by the
federal constitution, at least in some contexts, see Robert L. Brown, Expanded Rights
Through State Law: The United States Supreme Court Shows State Courts the Way, 4 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 499 (2002).
96. Green II, 2011 Ark. 92, at 12, 380 S.W.3d at 375 ("[W]hile appellant asks this
court to follow other states that have expanded their double jeopardy protections in this
context, appellant has failed to articulate an argument based on this state's double jeopardy
jurisprudence and does not even cite to the Arkansas Constitution in his argument."). The
relevant provision in the Arkansas Constitution states, "[N]o person, for the same offense,
shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty." ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 8.
97. For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized the rights of consenting
adults to engage in homosexual relations under the Arkansas Constitution by striking down
the state's sodomy law in Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002), prior to
the United States Supreme Court's same result in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
98. In Rikard v. State, the court summarized its development of state constitutional
doctrine diverging from federal constitutional protection, stating:
This court has recently imposed greater restrictions on police activities than
the United States Constitution in three cases based on our own state law.
See, e.g., Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002) (sodomy
statute infringes on right to privacy under various sections of Arkansas
Constitution); State v. Sullivan, 348 Ark. 647, 74 S.W.3d 215 (2002)
(pretextual arrest illegal under Art. 2, § 15, of Arkansas Constitution); Griffin
v. State, 347 Ark. 788, 67 S.W.3d 582 (2002) (nighttime incursions on a
defendant's curtilage illegal under Art. 2, § 15, of Arkansas Constitution).
Despite doing so, this court noted in Sullivan, that "there are occasions and
contexts in which federal Fourth Amendment interpretation provides
adequate protections against unreasonable law enforcement conduct;
however, there are also occasions when this court will provide more
protection under the Arkansas Constitution than that provided by the federal
courts." 348 Ark. at 652, 74 S.W.3d at 218. Furthermore, we observed in
Sullivan that one "pivotal inquiry" is "whether this court has traditionally
viewed an issue differently than the federal courts." Id, 74 S.W.3d at 218.
354 Ark. 345, 353, 123 S.W.3d 114, 118-19 (2003). The court also relied on the state
constitution in expanding protection of the home during nighttime searches, requiring
police to engage in a more restrictive "knock and talk" procedure than that required by the
Fourth Amendment. State v. Brown, 356 Ark. 460, 467-74, 156 S.W.3d 722, 727-32
(2004). However, the Brown court also admitted a need to exercise caution in expanding
reliance on state constitutional protections in departing from United States Supreme Court
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greater protection than the Supreme Court for an accused's right
to avoid multiple prosecutions. By statute, Arkansas bars
subsequent prosecution in state court following prosecutions in
federal court or courts of other states that are not precluded as a
matter of "dual sovereignty" under the Fifth Amendment.
99
In assessing the petitioner's claim, the Green II court
discussed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's reliance on its state
constitution to apply the prior jeopardy bar.100 Similar to Green
II, in Commonwealth v. Smith, the Pennsylvania court addressed
a double jeopardy claim in a murder prosecution, albeit one in
which the reviewing court found what might be seen as far more
egregious violations of the disclosure duty than apparent in
Green.10' Interestingly, the procedural histories of the two cases
are parallel; in both, the conviction rested on improperly
admitted hearsay and only after the new trial was ordered did the
defense learn of the prosecutor's suppression of favorable
evidence. 102 In Smith, both the State and its key witness denied
the existence of an agreement exchanging testimony for lenient
sentencing for the witness's unrelated crimes. 1°3  Such an
agreement did, in fact, exist, and the State's denial precluded the
defense from impeaching the witness's "veracity by exposing
his motivation to testify falsely against [the defendant] in order
to minimize his own punishment."
precedent. Id. at 470, 156 S.W.3d at 729. These developments in Arkansas state
constitutional jurisprudence also prompted scholarly comment, including an article by
Justice Brown, author of the opinion in Jegley. See Brown, supra note 95; see also Robert
F. Williams, The New Judicial Federalism Takes Root in Arkansas, 58 ARK. L. REV. 883
(2006) (examining the development of Arkansas constitutional law).
99. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-114(1) (Repl. 2013). The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine
permits successive prosecutions by different sovereigns for the same offense or conduct as
an exception to the double jeopardy bar. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 136-38
(1959) (stating an acquittal on a bank robbery charge, in federal court, does not bar
prosecution for the same crime in state court); see also Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 91-
94 (1985) (holding a prosecution and imposition of death sentence in Alabama was not
barred by prior conviction for capital murder on negotiated plea of life sentence in Georgia
where capital offense commenced with kidnapping in Alabama and concluded with
murder-for-hire in Georgia); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1959).
100. Green II, 2011 Ark 92, at 4-5, 380 S.W.3d at 371 (discussing Commonwealth
v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321 (Pa. 1992)).
101. Id. at 1-3, 380 S.W.3d at 369-701; Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321,
321-23 (Pa. 1992).
102. Green II, 2011 Ark. 92, at 2-3, 380 S.W.3d at 379; Smith, 615 A.2d at 322.
103. Smith, 615 A.2d at 322-23.
104. Id. at 323. The court found that the failure to correct the witness's false
testimony was intentional, not inadvertent. Id. ("[T]he Commonwealth deliberately denied
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In addition to the failure to correct the false testimony of its
cooperating witness, the prosecution in Smith also suppressed
physical evidence: sand located on the body of the deceased,
which could have substantiated the defense's theory regarding
the location of the murder and undermined the prosecution's
theory of the crime. 0 5 Because the discovery of the favorable
evidence was made only after new trial had been ordered on
direct appeal, Smith sought the protection of the double jeopardy
bar to correct the prosecutor's violation. 10 6
In contrast to Green, the prosecution's misconduct in Smith
extended beyond the initial disclosure failure to an extended
cover-up that was itself so egregious as to constitute misconduct
warranting relief from continued jeopardy for the defendant. 0 7
Prosecutors denied the existence of the "sand" evidence,
advancing the theory that the state trooper who testified at
Smith's trial that he had "lifted" the sand from the body had
actually lied about the evidence, suggesting that he might be
subject to prosecution for perjury. 10 8 Later, during the course of
trial, when the missing "lifters" (which the trooper had testified
he used to recover what he believed to be sand from the victim's
body) were discovered in the police evidence locker prosecutors
suppressed the discovery of the physical evidence. 10
Despite Pennsylvania precedent holding that the double
jeopardy remedy was circumscribed by the Supreme Court's
opinion in Kennedy,1 0 the Smith court ruled that the egregious
misconduct by the prosecution warranted application of the bar
the existence of the agreement pursuant to which its witness, Mr. Martray, received
extremely lenient treatment at his sentencing in return for his testimony against
appellant."). Martray was apparently an inmate who testified based upon inculpatory
statements purportedly made by Smith while they were both confined as Smith awaited
trial on the capital charge. Id. The Pennsylvania court did not name Martray in its decision
finding that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the conviction, but did
reference "the testimony of two fellow inmates of [the defendant]." Commonwealth v.
Smith, 568 A.2d 600, 605 (Pa. 1989). Thus, it appears that Smith, like Green, was forced
to defend against the testimony of a jailhouse informant who claimed that he had admitted
the crime while confined with him awaiting trial in his case. See supra text accompanying
notes 14-20.
105. Smith, 615 A.2d at 323.
106. Id. at 322.
107. Id. at 324.
108. Id. at 323.
109. Id.
110. Commonwealth v. Simons, 522 A.2d 537, 540 (Pa. 1987). The Arkansas
Supreme Court noted this point in Green 11, 2011 Ark. 92, at 6, 380 S.W.3d 368, 371.
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as a matter of Pennsylvania constitutional protection.111 The
Smith court rested its reasoning, at least in part, on the Kennedy
decision's retraction of its previous and more expansive view of
the protection afforded based on prior jeopardy. It noted that
under United States v. Dinitz, the Court explained:
The Double Jeopardy Clause does protect a defendant
against governmental actions intended to provoke mistrial
requests and thereby to subject defendants to the substantial
burdens imposed by multiple prosecutions. It bars retrials
where bad-faith conduct by judge or prosecutor threatens
the harassment of an accused by successive prosecutions or
declaration of a mistrial so as to afford the prosecution a
more favorable opportunity to convict the defendant.'
12
The Smith court noted that Pennsylvania courts followed
the Supreme Court's lead in Dinitz,11 then characterized the
Kennedy Court's limitation of the federal constitutional bar to
situations in which the prosecution deliberately goaded the
defense into moving for mistrial caustically as done under the
"guise of simplifying and clarifying the principle." '1 14 Finding
that the prosecutor's misconduct in the case "violates all
principles of justice and fairness embodied in the Pennsylvania
Constitution's double jeopardy clause," the court held that the
state constitution's double jeopardy clause precluded a retrial.115
The Arkansas court, however, declined Green's invitation
to broaden double jeopardy protection beyond that afforded in
Kennedy. Instead of following the lead of those state courts that
applied state law more broadly, and while clearly
acknowledging the Pennsylvania court's rationale for doing so
on the facts in Smith, the Green court chose to remain consistent
with Kennedy in its application of double jeopardy principles,
noting that other jurisdictions had done so, even when facing
facts comparable to those in Smith. 116  Moreover, the court
111. Smith, 615 A.2d at 324.
112. 424 U.S. 600 (1976) (citation omitted).
113. Smith, 615 A.2d at 324 (citing Commonwealth v. Starks, 416 A.2d 498, 500
(Pa. 1980)).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 324-25.
116. Green II, 2011 Ark. 92, at 5, 9-12, 380 S.W.3d 368, 371, 373-75. The court
noted that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reversed a trial court order barring
retrial of a death penalty conviction in State v. Moore, 969 So. 2d 169 (Ala. Crim. App.
2006), where the prosecutor had suppressed exculpatory evidence and had lied to the trial
1032
BRADY MISCONDUCT REMEDIES
observed that it had expressly committed to the Kennedy test in
prior decisions, including Jackson v. State, where the court cited
Kennedy in declining to extend the double jeopardy bar based on
a mistrial granted on the basis of the prosecution's misconduct
in making a prejudicial comment during its opening
statement. 11 7  While the defense in Jackson argued that the
prosecutor's misconduct was necessary to obtain a mistrial when
it needed another continuance, the Arkansas Supreme Court
accepted the trial court's findings that the mistrial was not the
result of bad faith or intention to provoke the defense into
moving for mistrial.1 18
Given that other jurisdictions continued to recognize
Kennedy as controlling on the question of the scope of double
jeopardy protection when the record shows misconduct by the
prosecutor that cannot be shown to have resulted from deliberate
intention of goading the accused into moving for mistrial, the
Green court found it appropriate to adopt a conservative tack in
holding that the new trial already ordered on direct appeal
adequately addressed the question of misconduct. 1 9 But there
was likely an additional factor that cautioned against a departure
from the usual remedy in such cases: unlike the facts in Smith
which prompted the Pennsylvania court to not feel constrained
by Kennedy, there was not sufficient certainty that the
misconduct in failing to disclose Chad Green's prior inconsistent
court by denying the existence of the evidence. Green II, 2011 Ark. 92, at 9, 380 S.W.3d
at 373. The court held that because there was no suggestion that the prosecutor goaded the
state into moving for mistrial, there was no authority to expand the protection beyond that
recognized in Kennedy. Id. (citing State v. Moore, 969 So. 2d 169, 180-81 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2006)). The Alabama court concluded that "[tihe prosecutor's withholding of
exculpatory evidence from the defendant may only be characterized as an overzealous
effort to gain a conviction from the first jury and not as an attempt to subvert [the
defendant's] 'valued right' by bringing the case before a second jury." Id at 9-10, 380
S.W.3d at 373 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Moore, 969 So. 2d 169, 180-81
(Ala. Crim. App. 2006)); see also State v. Morton, 153 P.3d 532, 538-39 (Kan. 2007)
(holding that Kennedy requires proof of the prosecutor's intention in provoking mistrial to
force the accused into "sacrificing his or her choice to live with the outcome from the first
jury"); State v. Barton, 240 S.W.3d 693, 702 (Mo. 2007) (en banc) (refusing to bar retrial
where the prosecutor failed to disclose the criminal history of its witness and also failed to
correct perjured testimony).
117. Green I1, 2011 Ark. 92, at 6-7, 380 S.W.3d at 372 (citing Jackson v. State, 322
Ark. 710, 911 S.W.2d 578 (1995)).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 12, 380 S.W.3d at 375 ("Appellant has received a new trial and thus has
received the relief to which he is entitled.").
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statement was deliberate or reflected bad faith.120 The majority
noted that "there was disagreement between the parties over
whether the prosecution acted intentionally or the non-disclosure
was inadvertent, or in the words of the State, a 'slip-up."'
121
Justice Paul Danielson dissented. 122  He agreed with the
Pennsylvania court in Smith and observed that, regardless of the
intent of the prosecutors in not disclosing Chad Green's prior
inconsistent statement, their action "[a]t the absolute least...
prevented Green from a possible acquittal. For this, the sole
remedy, I believe, would be a dismissal of the charges.' 23
The divide between the majority and Justice Danielson
illustrates the significant policy implications of the double
Jeopardy protection in particularly serious criminal cases. In
fact, the Smith court referred to the murder involved there as an
"infamous murder case" and phrased its grant of relief as
"compelled.' 24  Similarly, the capital charge in the Green
trilogy involved the murders of parents and their six-year old
son and eight-year old daughter. 125 Under Arkansas law, these
facts would support affirmative findings on at least two
aggravating circumstances necessary for imposition of a capital
sentence. 126
The imposition of the prior jeopardy bar to preclude retrial
or further prosecution in any criminal action necessarily means
that the individual defendant's right to protection from multiple
prosecutions will override the public's legitimate expectation
that criminal acts be punished and, at least in theory, that
prosecution, conviction, and punishment will deter others from
committing crimes. 127 This is a particularly difficult trade-off
when the accused will not face retrial-and therefore the
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Green II, 2011 Ark. 92, at 15, 380 S.W.3d at 376 (Danielson, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 16, 380 S.W.3d at 377.
124. Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 321 (Pa. 1992).
125. Green I, 365 Ark. 478, 483, 231 S.W.3d 638, 644 (2006).
126. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603(a)(l)-(3) (Repl. 2013) (authorizing the death
sentence only if aggravating circumstances, as found by the jury, outweigh all mitigating
circumstances and justify the death sentence); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-604(4) (Repl. 2013)
(death of more than one person in same criminal episode); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-
604(10)(B) (Repl. 2013) (victim "twelve (12) years of age or younger").
127. For a thoughtful discussion of the "balanc[ing] [of] two primary and sometimes
countervailing interests underlying double jeopardy-defendants' interests and societal
interests," see State v. Rogan, 984 P.2d 1231, 1242-44 (Haw. 1999).
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possibility of punishment-for a violent offense or one where
the circumstances, such as the age or infirmity of the victim or
sheer brutality of the crime, not only implicate a critical need for
deterrence, but also a legitimate public and private demand for
retribution. 12 8  Capital crimes, virtually by definition, involve
the greatest demand for both deterrence and retribution precisely
because they are reserved for the use of the death penalty.
One of the factors that courts may well consider in deciding
whether to expand upon Kennedy and fashion a double jeopardy
remedy under state law for Brady or other misconduct ' could
arguably be the strength of the prosecution's case. But the
problem with this approach is that the remedy for a Brady
violation itself requires an evaluation of the strength (though not
the sufficiency) of the prosecution's case, since relief is required
only if the defense can demonstrate that disclosure would have
resulted in a reasonable probability of a different outcome.1
30
Where, for instance, nondisclosure might lead to a compelling
inference that the prosecutor or police failed to disclose for fear
that the undisclosed evidence might have compromised the
chances for conviction or a substantial sentence, such as a
statutory maximum term of imprisonment or a death sentence,
the evidentiary calculation should almost certainly result in
relief.
Yet, this very approach suggests that prosecutors could
rationally risk new trial in the long run-particularly if
128. The law recognizes the private nature of an offense and reasonable need for
those intimately affected by the crime to express their personal sense of loss and outrage
through victim impact testimony in the sentencing phase of trial. See, e.g., Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825, 827 (1991).
129. In Rogan, for instance, the misconduct did not involve a Brady violation, but
the deliberate interjection of race-baiting in a prosecution of an African American
defendant for the alleged sexual assault of a twelve-year old girl. Rogan, 984 P.2d at 1235,
1238. During closing arguments, the prosecutor argued, in part: "This is every mother's
nightmare. Leave your daughter for an hour and a half, and you walk back in, and here's
some black, military guy on top of your daughter." Id. at 1238 (emphasis omitted). The
court rejected any claim that the argument amounted to an acceptable response to the
defense theory at trial because Rogan's identity was not an issue in the case and,
consequently, race was not a factor in the identification of the alleged perpetrator. Id. at
1240. Instead, the court condemned the argument in harsh terms, finding that such
statements "represent a brazen attempt to subvert a criminal defendant's right to trial by an'
impartial jury .... Such arguments foster jury bias through racial stereotypes and group
predilections, thereby promoting an atmosphere that is inimical to the consideration of the
evidence adduced at trial." Id.
130. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
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continuing suppression can be ensured-in favor of a conviction
in the short run. Here, then, the issue of intent might be the
critical factor since in a close case, the prosecution's
nondisclosure would be calculated to obtain conviction at the
expense of the defendant's right to due process. Where the
evidence available to support the State's theory of the case is not
substantial, nondisclosure necessarily suggests, as Justice
Danielson argued in his dissent in Green, that the prosecution's
intent was deliberately to obtain conviction at the cost of
fairness to the defendant. 131 Affording the prosecution a second
opportunity to trial after disclosure and litigation of the issue in
post-trial process fails to protect the accused's right to fair trial
by transforming the disclosure decision from one of
constitutional duty to chance.
Moreover, if the defense never discovers the suppression or
nondisclosure of the favorable evidence, it may never obtain
relief from the unfair trial-a trial that might have resulted in
acquittal had the evidence been disclosed-and the resulting
sentence which never would have been imposed. It is here
where the Kennedy limitation 132 undermines the federal prior
jeopardy guarantee-such a limitation may offer an incentive for
prosecutors and police not to disclose evidence favorable to the
accused in implicitly accepting the burden that eventual
disclosure could lead to relief and, thus, retrial. A fair reading
of the Fifth Amendment protection would lead one to conclude
that the prosecution should not benefit from its own
constitutional violation and still be permitted to proceed with
successive prosecutions, but Kennedy opens the door to strategic
decisions to approach the weak case in precisely such a
133
manner.
On the other hand, misconduct might prove so egregious,
such as the prosecution's blatant appeal to racial prejudice of
Jurors, that even in the context of overwhelming evidence, the
court should intervene to terminate the prosecution. 134 In this
situation, however, the application of the prior jeopardy bar
131. Green II, 2011 Ark. 92, at 15-16, 380 S.W.3d 368, 376-77 (Danielson, J.,
dissenting).
132. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 (1982).
133. See id. at 689 (Stevens, J., concurring) (providing hypotheticals to illustrate the
drawbacks of the majority opinion's limited approach).
134. See Rogan, 984 P.2d at 1238-40.
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would not reflect concern that the accused had been denied a fair
chance for acquittal, but instead results from the need to address
misconduct as a matter of maintaining the integrity of the
judicial system. When retrial is barred for a nonviolent or
relatively minor offense, the system's interest in internal
policing might well outweigh the public's interests in retribution
and deterrence. Much the same thing routinely happens during
the plea bargaining process when cases are disposed of with
little or no actual punishment when compared to the statutorily
authorized maximum sentences that could be imposed because
other factors, such as scarcity of judicial resources or prison
space, weigh against trials or lengthy periods of incarceration. It
also happens when the evidence supporting conviction is of
questionable probative value or simply lacking, or the accused
otherwise represents a less significant threat to public safety and
order than other defendants.I13
In a case involving a more severe crime, however, where
the evidence supporting the accused's guilt is overwhelming or
substantial and the nondisclosure would not otherwise violate
due process because of the "reasonable probability" of a
different outcome requirement, the public's interest in
conviction may be unfairly compromised by the use of the
double jeopardy protection to address the prosecutor's
misconduct indirectly. The problem posed by the conflicting
interests of public expectation of punishment for crimes and
ethical conduct of prosecutors is one that, almost necessarily,
should focus on the prosecutor's intent in the nondisclosure as a
primary consideration for whether jeopardy should be
terminated. To the contrary, however, Brady and later cases
focus on the likely effect of nondisclosure and do not depend on
any showing of bad faith or intent on the part of the
prosecution.
135. Some internal "policing" of the criminal justice system is likely essential to
promote respect for the courts, even when the misconduct does not reflect major or
substantial injustice. For instance, in Glover v. United States, the Court held that due to a
mistake in calculating the sentencing range under then-mandatory federal sentencing
guidelines, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim could rest on an error that amounted
only to a matter of months in terms of the difference in sentence. 531 U.S. 198, 200, 204
(2001).
136. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
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IV. THE GREEN COURT'S REMEDY: REFERRAL TO
THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
The Green majority addressed the problem posed by the
prosecutors' questionable intent, or bad faith, by referring those
attorneys to the Committee on Professional Conduct "to
determine whether any disciplinary action is warranted." 137 The
court did so questioning whether the Brady violation was merely
a "slip-up," as the State argued. 138  It did not personally
condemn the prosecutors' failure to disclose Chad Green's
inconsistent statement as deliberate or reflecting bad faith on
their part, in contrast to the Pennsylvania court's assessment in
Smith that "the record establishes the bad faith of the
prosecution beyond any possibility of doubt; indeed, it would be
hard to imagine more egregious prosecutorial tactics."' 3 9
One additional consideration should be noted in evaluating
the prosecutors' failure to disclose the exculpatory statement
given by Chad Green. There is often an argument advanced that
a prosecutor simply misinterpreted evidence in concluding that it
was not exculpatory, or misunderstood the Brady test in
concluding that the evidence could not have altered the outcome
of the case and, thus, was not subject to disclosure. Regardless
of any excuse for nondisclosure based on misunderstanding
Brady, Rule 17.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure
unequivocally required the Green prosecutors to disclose all of
Chad Green's statements. The rule requires prosecutors to
disclose to the defense "any written or recorded statements and
the substance of any oral statements made by the defendant or a
codefendant" that are in the prosecutor's possession, control, or
knowledge. 140  Chad Green was both a co-defendant and a
witness the prosecutor intended to call at trial. 14 1  Even
assuming that the prosecutors were unaware of their duty under
Brady, the state discovery rule unambiguously required
disclosure upon counsel's request.
142
137. Green II, 2011 Ark. 92, at 12, 380 S.W.3d 368,375.
138. Id.
139. Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 323 (Pa. 1992).
140. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.1(a)(ii).
141. Green III, 2013 Ark. 497, at 2,430 S.W.3d 729, 735.
142. See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.1(a)(ii).
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A. Justice Brown's Dissent Complaining of the Discipline
Committee Referral
The referral of the Green prosecutors for disciplinary
evaluation drew a dissent from Justice Robert Brown.' 43 While
conceding that the disclosure failure was serious and warranted
retrial, he still found the majority's referral ill advised. 144 But
unlike the majority, he included explanations from the
prosecutors themselves to support his disagreement over the
referral:
The prosecutor admitted that his failure to disclose
was a Brady violation but then said "as an officer of the
Court" that the failure was "a slip up" and "inadvertent"
and was not intentional. The trial judge then found that he
did not believe the prosecutor "hid the evidence."
Later, a second prosecutor told the judge that when he
read the second Chad Green statement, "it did not comport
with his previous versions of the case" and was not helpful
to the prosecution of Billy Dale Green. The prosecutor said
once the proffer was made by Chad Green's attorney, he
"simply forgot about it" and "it went out of my mind."45
This explanation of the facts is incomplete, however,
because Justice Brown never fully explained the "proffer made
by Chad Green's attorney.', 146 It likely relates directly to the
proffer made in connection with Chad Green's guilty plea in
which he agreed to accept a lesser sentence in return for his
testimony that would incriminate his father in the four capital
murders. 147 But it is not clear whether Chad Green's counsel
referenced the prior inconsistent statement during the guilty-plea
proceeding, or, in fact, why he would, since Arkansas law
requires only that there be a factual basis for the plea, and
compliance would only require a proffer, stipulation, or the
143. Green l, 2011 Ark. 92, at 12, 380 S.W.3d at 375 (Brown, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
144. Id. at 12-13, 380 S.W.3d at 375.
145. Id. at 13, 380 S.W.3d at 375.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2-3,380 S.W.3d at 370.
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defendant's testimony confirming his guilt on the offense
charged. 1
48
If, in fact, there was no reference to the prior inconsistent
statement during Chad Green's plea, then it might be more
reasonable to credit the prosecutor's testimony that he "simply
forgot about it" in concentrating on the evidence Chad Green
would be offering at trial. 149 On the other hand, if it had been
mentioned during the plea, it would seem far more difficult to
credit the prosecutor's claimed defect of memory. In fairness to
Justice Brown, he did not simply accept the prosecutors'
explanations or trial court's finding that they had not engaged in
intentional misconduct in "hiding of evidence."15 He
explained:
The majority's opinion opens the door to referrals to
the Committee for disciplinary action even for
unintentional mistakes made by prosecutors during
investigations. If the majority is referring the two
prosecutors in this case to the Committee for negligence,
will this court, henceforth, be referring all prosecutors
involved in Brady violations to the Committee for
discipline, even when the conduct equates only to
negligence? I dissent on this single point because it is an
important one. Referring conduct to the Committee is a
serious matter. The point needs to be clarified.
151
This explanation suggests that professional discipline is
never appropriate for misconduct that "equates only to
negligence," and therefore the court should not even consider
referral to the Committee for negligent prosecutorial conduct.
152
In suggesting that negligence should be insulated from review as
unintentional deviation from professional norms, Justice Brown
rests his apparent concern on the relevant standard adopted by
the American Bar Association governing the conduct of
prosecutors. That standard provides:
A prosecutor should not intentionally fail to make
timely disclosure to the defense, at the earliest feasible
148. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 24.6 ("The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere without making such inquiry as will establish that there is a
factual basis for the plea.").
149. Green 11, 2011 Ark. 92, at 13, 380 S.W.3d at 375.
150. Id.




opportunity, of the existence of all evidence or information
which tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate
the offense charged or which would tend to reduce the
punishment of the accused. 153
While the ABA standard is couched in terms of intentional
misconduct, it does not address the problem of negligent
misconduct. Justice Brown found persuasive the Colorado
Supreme Court's opinion in In re Attorney C, an action
involving discipline imposed upon a prosecutor for failing to
timely disclose Brady material.' 1 4 However, both the facts and
nature of the violation involved in Attorney C undermine Justice
Brown's reliance on the Colorado decision when viewed in light
of the nondisclosure in Green.
B. The Colorado Supreme Court's Requirement of
Intentional Misconduct for Ethical Imposition of Ethical
Sanctions
At the outset, it should be noted that Attorney C was a case
of first impression in which the Colorado Supreme Court was
called upon to determine at precisely what stage of the criminal
process the prosecuting attorney must disclose evidence
favorable to the accused. 55  The court framed the issue as
determining "the parameters of a prosecutor's ethical duty to
disclose exculpatory material to the defense under Colo. RPC
3.8(d)."'15 6 It held that the Colorado procedural rule "requires
prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense in
advance of any critical stage of the proceeding."'
' 57
Thus, the sanction imposed in the prosecutor's case and
ultimately overridden by the Colorado Supreme Court involved
noncompliance with a state procedural rule. 158 The prosecutor
did not have the benefit of the court's interpretation of the rule
requiring disclosure at any particular stage of the proceedings
because the language of the rule itself refers only to "timely
153. Id. at 14, 380 S.W.3d at 376 (citing Standard 3-3.11, in ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 81 (AM. BAR
ASS'N, 3d ed. 1993)).
154. Green II, 2011 Ark. 92, at 14, 380 S.W.3d at 376 (citing In re Attorney C, 47
P.3d 1167, 1174 (Colo. 2002) (en banc)).
155. In re Attorney C, 47 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Colo. 2002) (en banc).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1174-75.
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disclosure., 159 The court's framing of the issue is critical to its
holding the prosecutor liable for nondisclosure on the facts
presented in the case. Attorney C's misconduct is far different
from that of the prosecutors in Green, who failed to disclose the
prior inconsistent statement of Chad Green prior to the capital
trial, and who, in fact, conceded that they had violated the Brady
command. 16
0
Of particular importance, the prosecutor in Attorney C
disclosed the exculpatory evidence in both of the cases giving
rise to her initial sanction by the disciplinary board prior to the
defendants' trials. 161  In both cases, she failed to disclose
exculpatory evidence prior to the preliminary hearing during
which the accused was bound over for trial, but did so almost
immediately after the hearings. 162  In the first case, the
prosecutor failed to disclose a handwritten recantation of the
complainant's claim that the accused had not pushed her to the
ground, breaking her finger, but had merely bumped into her,
which was consistent with the accused's version of events.163
In the second case, the trial court held that it would have
bound the defendant over for trial even had it known of the
complainant's recantation of allegations that the defendant, her
step brother, had engaged in oral/genital contact with her,
because she testified at the hearing consistently with her
allegations that her step brother had engaged in hand/genital and
genital/genital contact. 164 The prosecutor did not disclose the
recantation prior to the preliminary hearing out of concern that
her entire office might be disqualified from the case and her
supervisor, notified of her concern, concurred in her decision. 16
5
Even though the evidence was exculpatory, the trial court denied
sanctions, reasoning that disclosure would not have altered the
159. COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8(d) (2015) (requiring criminal
prosecutors to "make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known
to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and,
in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged
mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of
this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal").
160. Green II, 2011 Ark. 92, at 2-3, 380 S.W.3d 368, 370.
161. Attorney C, 47 P.3d at 1168-69.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1168.




outcome of the preliminary hearing. 166
The Colorado court concluded that Attorney C's actions were
not intentional, and it adopted the language of the ABA
Standard 3-3.11(a) in finding that discipline should not have
been imposed absent her intent.1 67 Thus, even though the court
specifically found that "the respondent made a conscious
decision to delay disclosure in both cases until after those
[preliminary hearings] concluded," it did not find that Attorney
C acted intentionally, as defined in the ABA Standards. 168
Proof of this standard for intent effectively insulates
prosecutors from ethical sanctions for noncompliance with the
Brady disclosure requirement because it requires proof that
nondisclosure was not based on inadvertence or mistake in
evaluating the exculpatory value of evidence, but actually
calculated to result in conviction. Any dedicated prosecutor
pursuing conviction and believing in the credibility of her
witnesses, physical evidence, and theory of the case is likely to
underestimate the potential for unfavorable evidence to
influence jurors or trial judges in the outcome of the case.
Despite the Kyles majority's assumption that prosecutors will
lean toward disclosure in close cases, 169 the prosecutor herself
may not find that unfavorable or conflicting evidence would
meet the standard of probably resulting in a different outcome in
the case if disclosed. In order to demonstrate sanctionable
misconduct under the approach taken in Attorney C, there would
almost certainly have to be an admission on the part of the
166. Attorney C, 47 P.3d at 1169. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected this
approach and found, on the contrary:
We do not accept the argument that the evidence need only be disclosed in
advance of a proceeding at which that evidence would be specifically
determinative. Rather, we conclude that if evidence is material to the
outcome of the trial, then the prosecutor must disclose that evidence in
advance of the next critical stage of the proceeding-whether the evidence
would particularly affect that hearing or not.
Id. at 1171.
167. Id. at 1173-74 (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-3.11,
which prohibit a prosecutor from "intentionally fail[ing] to make timely disclosure to the
defense" of all exculpatory evidence). "Intentional" means having the "conscious
objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result." ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE § 6.2.
168. Attorney C, 47 P.3d at 1172, 1174.
169. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995).
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prosecutor that her intent was to suppress evidence in order to
obtain conviction.
Attorney C's disclosure of the exculpatory evidence in the
two cases before the Colorado disciplinary panel could hardly be
calculated to obtain an unfair advantage at trial enhancing the
prospects for conviction because she made the disclosures well
in advance of trial.170  Only because the Colorado rule, as
interpreted by the Colorado court, required disclosure at any
"critical stage" in the proceedings-including the preliminary
hearing-was the prosecutor in technical violation of the
"timely" disclosure provision of the rule. 17 1 The violation can
be described as "technical" because, in lacking the required
intent for imposition of sanctions, it could not be sustained.
Justice Brown's reliance on Attorney C is, at best,
premature because the Arkansas court had not articulated what
level of culpability, negligence, knowledge or intent, must be
demonstrated in order to establish an ethical breach by a
prosecutor committing Brady misconduct. He did characterize
the problem he saw in the Green majority's referral to the
disciplinary committee as inappropriate "when the conduct
equates only to negligence," however. 173 He suggested that the
referral itself amounts to discipline, apparently presupposing
that a finding favorable to the prosecutors by the disciplinary
authority would still amount to some type of sanction.1 4 But,
then, how else could the appropriate authority, the disciplinary
body in the jurisdiction, ever determine whether Brady
misconduct was the result of negligence, knowledge, or intent
on the part of a non-disclosing prosecutor? To suggest that
referrals should only be made when the prosecutor did not fail to
act as a result of negligence, rather than with some greater
degree of intent, would mean that the disciplinary process would
not even be triggered unless the prosecutor had been shown to
be more culpable than negligent in the nondisclosure. And, isn't
that the point of the investigative and, in appropriate cases,
170. Attorney C, 47 P.3d at 1168-69.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1174.
173. Green 11, 2011 Ark. 92, at 14-15, 380 S.W.3d 368, 376 (Brown, J., dissenting in




adjudication process in the first place-to make that
determination?
C. Negligence and Ethical Violations
Apart from this procedural question, a substantive issue is
raised by both Justice Brown's dissent in Green and the opinion
in Attorney C: why should discipline for ethical infractions
relating to Brady misconduct be limited to proof of those
reflecting intentional misconduct on the part of prosecutors?
Brady-based due process violations are not predicated on proof
of bad faith or intentional misconduct on the part of prosecutors,
as the Supreme Court has consistently held. 75 This approach
focuses on the injury to the accused's right to fair trial and
process, rather than serves as a basis for punishment of
prosecutors resulting from their failures.
Once a Brady violation has been established-meaning that
a nondisclosure has been found sufficiently prejudicial to
warrant relief from a conviction or sentence imposed-the
injury to the accused's constitutional rights to fair trial and due
process is implicit in that finding. A personal failure on the part
of the prosecuting attorney, regardless of whether attributable to
negligence or intent or an intermediate level of culpability, as
opposed to a failure on the part of an investigator or other non-
attorney member of the prosecuting team, has resulted in that
constitutional violation. Certainly, in the process during which
the nondisclosure claim is investigated and litigated, including
the legal determination as to whether the nondisclosure was
sufficiently prejudicial as to require relief, a finding that the
prosecutor was not personally involved in the nondisclosure
should not result in imposition of ethical sanctions against the
prosecutor. This standard would preclude sanctions, so long as
the responsible actor did not suppress the evidence at the
direction of the prosecutor or in response to some directive
suggesting that suppression by police would be tolerated. The
difficulty in these latter circumstances would be to discern
whether an unstated policy followed by the prosecutor's office
175. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432 (1995) (quoting Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)); see also supra text accompanying note 62.
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promotes suppression of favorable evidence by non-attorney
members of the prosecution team.'
1 76
Not every negligent act on the part of a prosecuting
attorney, even personally, should likely be subject to sanctions
as an ethical violation through the jurisdiction's disciplinary
process, of course. Many instances of inadvertence or
negligence by counsel in litigation simply do not suggest that the
proceedings have been tainted, or that an opposing party has
been treated so unfairly that the trial court's curative action
would be insufficient to address the problem. For instance, in
criminal trials, an improper question posed to a witness or an
improper line of argument during summation is typically subject
to cure by timely and thorough instruction by the trial court and
will not warrant termination of the trial. 177 Sometimes, the
prosecutor responds to defense counsel's tactics at trial and,
176. In a sense, the prosecutor's course of action in In re Attorney C suggests this
scenario with respect to the second case reviewed-the prosecutor's belated disclosure was
itself approved by her supervisor, the district attorney. 47 P.3d at 1169. The court noted:
"The respondent decided not to inform Buck of the changed version herself before the
hearing because she was concerned that her whole office could be disqualified if Buck
called her as a witness." Id. She consulted her boss, the district attorney, who did not
object to this course of action. Id. One could well argue that while Attorney C's untimely
disclosure should not warrant discipline, the supervisor's conduct and decision-making
should have been subjected to consideration by the disciplinary authority. Id. at 1173. The
issue of office policy in the context of non-disclosure was the subject of a civil rights
action in Connick v. Thompson, discussed in the next section of this article. 563 U.S. 51
(2011).
177. Even egregious misconduct in closing arguments may be cured by timely
instruction by the trial court, particularly if the prosecutor's improper argument has been
suggested by the defense in its argument. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181-82
(1986). In Darden, the prosecutor engaged in a series of improprieties, including
characterizing the defendant as an "animal," stating that he wished the victim had "blown
[the defendant's] face off," and that he could "see [the defendant] sitting here with no face,
blown away by a shotgun." Id. at 179-80 n.12. The Darden majority condemned the
argument, but held that it was not sufficiently egregious to violate due process. Id. at 181.
The trial court admonished jurors that the prosecutor's argument did not constitute
evidence, and the majority found it unlikely that the jury was unfairly influenced. Id. at
182. Finally the majority concluded that defense counsel was actually able to use the
argument in a tactically sound manner in defusing jury passion against the accused. Id. at
182-83.
But, in Caldwell v. Mississippi, the Court vacated a death sentence based on the
prosecutor's improper argument that jurors should not worry about error in their sentencing
decision because an appellate review would correct any impropriety. 472 U.S. 320, 323
(1985). The improper argument in Caldwell drew the majority's attention because it
undermined the credibility of the jury sentencing process itself in considering imposition of
a death sentence. Id. at 340-41.
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although the response might not otherwise be appropriate, 178 it
does not taint the proceedings such that termination of the trial is
warranted, being characterized as having been invited by the
defense. 17  Or, the impropriety might simply reflect a lack of
better judgment in a very passionate or hotly contested
proceeding of the kind that we might expect from very seasoned
and otherwise even-tempered lawyers because the reality of trial
is that it is a form of intellectual and emotional combat.
Consider the definition of "negligence" adopted in the
ABA Standards and cited with approval by the court in Attorney
C:
Negligence is defined as "the failure of a lawyer to
heed a substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a
result will follow, which failure is a deviation from the
standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in
the situation." Negligent violation of a court order or rule
presumptively occasions a reprimand or admonition,
depending upon whether the conduct causes in'ury
potential injury to a client or to a legal proceeding. 18
Applying this standard to the conduct of the prosecutors in
Green, it would be difficult not to find that they should be
sanctioned in the disciplinary process because their "conduct
cause[d] injury or potential injury" to both a client and the legal
proceeding. Here, the injury to the client could relate to the
State or to the accused, although the Standards may actually
contemplate only misconduct resulting in injury to counsel's
own client. Regardless, the legal proceeding has suffered injury
whenever a Brady violation requires relief from a judgment in
favor of the accused. That is also true when a violation triggers
the bar of prior jeopardy to preclude further prosecution, as in
Smith.
178. For example, a prosecutor cannot comment on a defendant's decision to remain
silent and not testify at trial. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). The defense
is entitled to an instruction advising the jury that the defendant's silence may not be
considered as evidence against him or otherwise in arriving at the verdict. Carter v.
Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 303 (1981). But the prosecution may respond to defense
counsel's argument that the government had not given the defendant a chance to explain
facts. United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1988).
179. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (finding that it is
improper for a prosecutor to express his or her personal opinion as to the accused's guilt,
but may respond to an argument of opposing counsel).
180. In re Attorney C, 47 P.3d 1167, 1173 (Pa. 2002) (citation omitted) (quoting
ABA Standard 6.2).
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In Green, the interests of the State, the accused, and the
court were all implicated by the prosecutors' failure to disclose
the exculpatory statement made by Chad Green.181 Even though
retrial had already been ordered by the Arkansas Supreme Court
based on the improper admission of evidence at the capital trial,
the integrity of the State's case and the defendant's perception of
the fairness of the proceedings were compromised by the
subsequent discovery of the undisclosed statement. 18
2
Moreover, the published opinion responding to the dismissal
motion based on double jeopardy grounds casts the
prosecution's integrity and, perhaps in an important sense, the
very credibility of its case against Green, in doubt-and in a
public forum.'
83
The suppression of evidence of significant value for
impeachment of Chad Green's testimony at a retrial, coupled
with the fact that other prosecution evidence adduced before the
jury was inadmissible, created some doubt as to whether Green
was guilty of the capital offenses-a doubt that might linger for
some despite his eventual conviction. Almost more troubling is
the very real possibility that the State's case would have been so
corrupted by the prosecutors' misconduct that Green might well
have avoided conviction. Because the public has a reasonable
expectation that offenders will be prosecuted and convicted, the
public's interest in the conviction of an offender who committed
four murders, including the murder of two children, will be
compromised if the nondisclosure ultimately undermines the
prosecution's position so severely that retrial, or conviction
upon retrial, is frustrated. The public's confidence in the ability
of the criminal process to accomplish its intended objective
would then be damaged as an unintended consequence of the
Brady violation. Similarly, had Green, in fact, actually been
innocent rather than "not guilty" of the capital crimes, then any
moral vindication he might expect in an acquittal at trial would
also likely have been compromised by public perception that his
acquittal was the result of technicalities or the prosecutors'
mistake in mishandling Chad Green's prior inconsistent
statement.
181. Green II, 2011 Ark. 92, at 4, 380 S.W.3d 368, 371.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 2-3, 380 S.W.3d at 370.
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In this respect, the misconduct of the prosecutors in Green
surely warrants sanctions under the negligence definition set out
in ABA Standard 6.2, assuming that their conduct reflects "the
failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial risk that circumstances
exist or that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation
from the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would
exercise in the situation."' 84 Here, the standard sets out the duty
of the prosecutor without ambiguity.
V. MISCONDUCT AND JEOPARDY: THE PROBLEM OF
REMEDY
In light of the clear and consistently applied principle of
Brady and successive cases-that evidence in the possession of
the prosecution must be disclosed if favorable to the accused,
and that nondisclosure or suppression will result in a due process
violation if it was reasonably probable that the result of the
proceedings would have been different had the evidence been
disclosed-Standard 6.2 establishes a very reasonable standard
of care to be exercised by prosecutors.1 85 The admonition by the
Kyles majority that prosecutors should err on the side of
disclosure 86 implicitly recognizes the same guiding principle
articulated in In re Attorney C-that the lawyer should "heed a
substantial risk" that a course of action could lead to adverse
consequences in noting the behavior of a "reasonable lawyer."' 18
7
The New Mexico Supreme Court, in State v. Breit, noted:
[T]he prosecutor is actually aware, or is presumed to
be aware, of the potential consequences of his or her
actions. The term connotes a conscious and purposeful
decision by the prosecutor to dismiss any concern that his
or her conduct may lead to a mistrial or reversal. 188
It then concluded:
Though we indicate the official must know, or under
certain circumstances is presumed to know, that the
conduct is improper, we doubt a claim of lack of experience
could lift the bar of double jeopardy. Rare are the instances
184. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 6.2 (2011).
185. Id.; see, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432-35 (1995).
186. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 439.
187. 47 P.3d 1167, 1173 (Colo. 2002) (citing STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE §
6.2 (2011)).
188. 930 P.2d 792, 803 (N.M. 1996).
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of misconduct that are not violations of rules that every
legal professional, no matter how inexperienced, is charged
with knowing. 189
The New Mexico approach is consistent with addressing
the proper scope of the protection afforded by prior jeopardy
provisions in the federal and state constitutions and the need to
ensure that prosecutors conform their practices to ethical norms.
Clear violations of the ethical duties imposed upon prosecuting
attomeys warrant discipline, but discipline itself does not redress
a violation of the individual's constitutional expectation that he
will not be subjected to multiple trials for the same offense.
Regardless of the personal culpability or lack of culpability on
the part of the prosecutor, a violation of the prior jeopardy
protection represents a significant intrusion upon the
constitutional rights of the accused.190
While the Arkansas court rejected the double jeopardy
argument advanced in Green,1 91 its determination does not
necessarily suggest the type of injustice evident in cases of
prosecutorial misconduct when the accused is subsequently
shown to have been actually innocent of the charge upon which
he has been convicted. The cost of a terminated proceeding in
which an accused's guilt-or innocence-may never be
determined is part of the constitutional bargain that is struck by
the protection of individual rights. In Shelton v. State, for
instance, the same court held that the prosecutor's successful
motion for mistrial, based upon defense counsel's claimed
misstatement as to the nature of the defense in his opening
statement, effectively barred retrial of the capital case.' 92 The
court found there existed no "overruling or manifest necessity"
for a mistrial because defense counsel's opening merely
responded to facts the prosecutor alluded to in his own opening
statement. 193
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 383 U.S. 83 (1963); see also supra text
accompanying notes 68-70.
191. Green II, 2011 Ark. 92, at 12, 380 S.W.3d 368, 375.
192. 2009 Ark. 388, at 2-3,326 S.W.3d 429, 431.
193. Id. at 4-5, 326 S.W.3d at 432. In Koster v. State, the overruling or manifest
necessity was the explosion of a bomb outside the courthouse during the defendant's trial
on a charge of (among other things) possession of a prohibited weapon, after defense
counsel brought what appeared to be an explosive device into the courtroom and the trial
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Shelton's retrial on a capital murder charge was barred by
the trial court's decision to grant the prosecution's improvident
motion for mistrial. 194  The consequence of the State's action
was that the public's reasonable expectation-that the
prosecution would determine whether a capital or lesser crime
had been committed by Shelton and that an appropriate
punishment would be imposed in the event of conviction-was
effectively and permanently frustrated. Yet, that is the
necessary result in the event of violation of an accused's
similarly legitimate expectation that the protection afforded by
constitutional bars against multiple prosecution for the same
offense will not be denied based upon the nature of the crime or
the likelihood that the accused is culpable.
Continuing instances of prosecutorial misconduct in
suppression of evidence favorable to the accused in criminal
cases suggest that enforcement of the Brady disclosure
obligation is compromised by a number of factors.' 95  First,
because the remedy is wholly dependent upon the defense's
discovery of the suppressed evidence or the prosecution's later
disclosure, the remedy is, at best, sufficient only when the
suppressed evidence is actually available for challenging a
conviction obtained by the State in a proceeding in which the
evidence could not be evaluated and used by the defense. If the
accused has been acquitted, or pleaded guilty in a situation in
which the undisclosed evidence would not have made any
difference in the outcome of the proceedings, there is
functionally no formal remedy for willful misconduct on the part
of the non-disclosing prosecutor or members of the prosecution
team.
Moreover, even if there is proof of egregious misconduct,
such as deliberate suppression of exculpatory evidence, the
judge could not determine whether it had been disarmed. 374 Ark. 74, 78-79, 286 S.W.3d
152, 157-58 (2008).
194. Shelton, 2009 Ark. 388, at 1,326 S.W.3d at 431.
195. It has recently been recognized that Brady violations remain a source of
continuing problems in the prosecution of criminal cases. For instance, Ninth Circuit Chief
Judge Alex Kozinski, in dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc in United States v.
Olsen, concluded: "There is an epidemic of Brady violations abroad in the land. Only
judges can put a stop to it." 737 F.3d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 2013). Despite Chief Judge
Kozinski's stirring characterization of the violation and the fact that four other Ninth
Circuit judges joined in his dissent, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Olsen v. United
States, 134 S. Ct. 2711 (2014).
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Brady formula for demonstrating a due process violation
warranting relief is often-perhaps more often than not-
difficult for the injured defendant to meet. It almost necessarily
requires post-conviction or extraordinary litigation measures in
which the convicted defendant has no constitutional right to
counsel. 196 The reality of criminal practice is that once a case
has been closed by conviction on guilty plea, affirmance on
appeal, or other final disposition, counsel may not be likely to
continue pursuing relief on a claim of misconduct, particularly if
the suppressed evidence is not readily provided from some other
source.
Once the defendant has exhausted available state and
federal post-conviction remedies, the subsequent discovery of
exculpatory or impeachment evidence not disclosed in time to
afford the defendant the option of challenging his conviction or
sentence in the initial round of post-conviction proceedings may
result in procedural burdens compromising even the relatively
high standard of proof for establishing violations under Brady.
For instance, if a state court defendant has exhausted federal
habeas remedies provided for in Section 2254,197 subsequent
discovery of suppressed evidence will not provide an additional
round of litigation unless the defendant is able to show that the
belated discovery has produced "clear and convincing evidence"
that the defendant would not have been convicted by a rational
fact finder had the suppressed evidence been available to him for
use at trial.198 A more timely discovery permits the defendant to
seek relief under Brady, in contrast, requiring a showing only
that there is a reasonable probability that the evidence, if
disclosed, would have resulted in a different outcome. 199 Thus,
continuing suppression of favorable evidence has the perhaps-
196. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610-11 (1974) (Sixth Amendment right to
assistance of counsel does not extend to discretionary review of proceedings following
disposition of direct appeal, nor to petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court);
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (Sixth Amendment does not recognize
right to state post-conviction process; therefore, no right to assistance of counsel in state
post-conviction proceedings); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (neither Eighth
Amendment, nor due process, require assistance of counsel for inmates challenging death
sentences imposed in state post-conviction proceedings).
197. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) (affording defendants convicted in state court the right
to pursue federal constitutional claims that have been exhausted in the state courts by filing
a petition for federal habeas relief).
198. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(B)(ii) (2012).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
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unintended consequence of making it more difficult for the
defendant whose right to disclosure has been violated to obtain
relief once the direct appeal and usual first round of post-
conviction remedies have ended.200
Second, the remedy for a proven Brady violation-
typically a new trial or resentencing proceeding--does not deter
prosecutors or police who are willing to assume the risk of a
later disclosure of a violation in order to improve the chance for
conviction. Whatever theoretical deterrent effect the remedy
may have, the likelihood that the violation will be discovered or
that the defendant could meet the burden of establishing
prejudice warranting relief under Brady compromises the
deterrent for those willing to violate the rule. For one thing, trial
attorneys are often primarily concerned with the immediate
results in a trial or other proceeding, rather than the longer-term
ultimate disposition in a case. Consequently, the threat that
disclosure of suppressed evidence will eventually require relief
in the form of a new trial or a new sentencing proceeding well
after the prosecutor has obtained a conviction based on a jury
verdict or guilty plea may not really serve to deter misconduct
calculated to obtain that conviction. This is particularly true in
serious felony prosecutions, often high-profile in the
community, in which the State's case is precarious in light of
supporting evidence, meaning that compliance with Brady may
serve to improve the defense's position.2 01 In a close case, the
200. This is not universally true because some jurisdictions do not limit the number
of applications that may be brought seeking post-conviction or habeas corpus relief. See,
e.g., State v. Forbes, 119 P.3d 144 (N.M. 2005) (granting habeas relief to inmate convicted on
testimonial statement of co-defendant not subject to cross-examination where direct appeal
resulted in affirrnance in 1987), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1274 (2007). The defendant was
released from custody after twenty-four years of incarceration upon dismissal of capital murder
charges following grant of state post-conviction relief. Id. at 145.
Similarly, jurisdictions may not impose time limits on claims based on newly available
evidence previously suppressed or not disclosed by the prosecution. For instance, Arkansas
recognizes that such claims must be brought by petitioning for writ of error coram nobis, an
ancient writ that provides a vehicle for reinvesting jurisdiction in the trial court to reopen the
case for consideration of whether the defendant's right to disclosure of favorable evidence has
been violated by the prosecutor. Adler v. State, 35 Ark. 517, 524-26 (1880). For the history
of the writ of coram nobis in Arkansas, see John H. Haley, Comment, Coram Nobis and
the Convicted Innocent, 9 ARK. L. REV. 118 (1955).
201. Consider allegations in the recent, high-profile, and highly sensationalized
prosecution of Casey Anthony in Florida for the alleged capital murder of her daughter,
Caylee. Lizette Alvarez, Software Designer Reports Error in Anthony Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
July 19, 2011, at A14. Following Anthony's acquittal, an expert witness relied on by the
prosecution announced he provided incorrect data to the police supporting the claim made
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incentive for noncompliance may overwhelm even the rational
instinct to comply relied upon by the Kyles Court when the
majority suggested that prosecutors would logically decide in
favor of disclosure when faced with a close question of whether
evidence is favorable to the defense. 20 2 This rather naYve view
of prosecutors fails to appreciate that prosecutors try cases to
win and to prosecute defendants typically because they believe
they are, in fact, guilty.
Moreover, the reality is that once a defendant has been
convicted, particularly after a jury verdict, a reversal on direct
appeal, or relief ordered on collateral review, the most likely
result is that the case will eventually be disposed of by a
negotiated guilty plea. The defense's position is often
significantly improved by the vacation of the conviction.
Moreover, if the basis for the remand for further proceedings is a
Brady violation, the relief granted necessarily results from
discovery of evidence withheld by the prosecution that is
sufficiently strong to improve the defense's position in a new
trial. Otherwise, of course, the defense will not have met its
burden of showing that the non-disclosed evidence offered a
reasonable probability of a different outcome had it been
disclosed for use by the defense at trial or in evaluating the
option of a guilty plea.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Arkansas Supreme Court's referral of the prosecuting
attorneys to the Committee on Professional Conduct produced
no public record of action disciplining the two prosecutors for
their actions in failing to disclose Chad Green's statement
exculpating his father, 20 3 perhaps suggesting that Justice
Brown's concerns were overblown. This is not, however,
surprising in light of the historical evidence that ethical
discipline has rarely proved successful in addressing infractions.
at trial that Anthony visited a website using the search term "chloroform" eighty-four times
prior to the child's disappearance and, in fact, his revised data showed that she had only
used the term in a single search. Id. The prosecution argued that Anthony's repeated
search for "chloroform" on Google indicated premeditation in planning the murder. Id.
The prosecutor did not disclose the expert's corrected conclusion-which had been
provided to police and prosecutors prior to trial-to defense counsel. Id.
202. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995).
203. Green II, 2011 Ark. 92, at 12,380 S.W.3d 368, 375.
1054
BRADY MISCONDUCT REMEDIES
Moreover, the willingness of prosecutors to proceed in
derogation of the constitutional disclosure duty, particularly in
high-profile cases or cases involving especially heinous crimes,
appears clear in light of the continuing revelations of
misconduct. The dramatic action taken by the Department of
Justice in moving to vacate the conviction of former United
States Senator Ted Stevens from Alaska-obtained prior to
disclosure by the Attorney General of significant misconduct of
the Stevens prosecutors-demonstrates that the weakness of
potential remedies for redress simply fails to impact
prosecutorial decision-making with respect to Brady disclosure
obligations.20 4 After Senator Stevens was convicted of lying in
failing to report gifts on his Senate Financial Disclosure forms,
the D.C. District Court vacated his conviction based on
prosecutorial misconduct in failing to disclose discoverable
evidence to the defense.20 5 This followed the disclosure by an
F.B.I. agent claiming "whistleblower" status of irregularities in
the investigation and pretrial phases committed by the
Government. 20 6 The prosecutors were removed from the case
and the Government itself filed a motion to set aside the
conviction and for dismissal of the charges against Senator
Stevens with prejudice. 20 7 Based on disclosures of misconduct
in violating prior court orders and the prosecution's obligations
under Brady, the trial court ordered relief, setting aside the
verdict.20
8
The Stevens case was perhaps the highest-profile
prosecution in recent history to be publicly tainted by
misconduct of prosecutors in failing to disclose exculpatory
evidence required by Brady and subsequent decisions of the
209Supreme Court. Despite the compelling evidence of
misconduct by federal prosecutors in the case, a special
prosecutor appointed by the trial judge nevertheless concluded
204. See In re Contempt Finding, 744 F. Supp. 2d 253 (D. D.C. 2010).
205. Id. at 256, 261-62.
206. Id. at 254.
207. Id. at 261.
208. Id. at 262.
209. The Government's misconduct resulted in substantial coverage in the national
press, reporting findings that almost certainly must undermine public confidence in the
criminal justice system. See, e.g,, Brent Kendall, Probe Finds Misconduct in Case Against
Senator, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2011, at A4.
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that the lawyers responsible should not themselves be
prosecuted for criminal contempt.210
Professor Kevin McMunigal has observed that the
enforcement of disciplinary rules in instances involving
disclosure failures has been uneven, with some evidence of
increasing vigilance on the part of courts and disciplinary
bodies, but continuing lack of enforcement in some
jurisdictions. 211 He noted that while ABA Model Rule 3.8(d)-
which requires disclosure consistent with Brady and its
progeny-was included in the 1983 version of the rules, as well
as the predecessor provision, the 1969 ABA Model Code, few
jurisdictions included this provision in their ethical standards
over the forty-year period since.
2 12
There are likely a number of reasons why professional
discipline appears less successful as a remedy for prosecutorial
misconduct than one might expect in a profession obliged to
defend the Constitution, including the protections it affords
criminal defendants. Clearly, one reason is the leniency of
officials in judging the actions of colleagues in the legal
profession-particularly when the aggrieved party, like Billy
Dale Green, has been convicted of a heinous offense, or is
otherwise not blessed with pristine character, untarnished
reputation, or simply lack of recognized status within the
community.
The late Professor Fred C. Zacharias offered one possible
explanation for the reluctance of professional conduct bodies to
discipline prosecutors in his important article reviewing the
disciplinary process.213 He observed that, perhaps ironically, the
leeway given to prosecutors might logically reflect the
traditional recognition of defense counsel's obligation to
aggressively represent the accused:
Apparently because of the heightened sense of combat
that occurs in the criminal arena, disciplinary authorities are
readier to adopt an "anything goes" attitude.
210. See Del Quentin Wilber, Stevens Prosecutors Shouldn't Be Charged,
Investigator Suggests, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2011, at A2.
211. See Kevin C. McMunigal, The (Lack oj) Enforcement of Prosecutor Disclosure
Rules, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 847, 847-50, 857-60, 862 (2010).
212. Id. at 850-51.




Such leniency, of course, is consistent with the sense
of many commentators that criminal defense lawyers have
a higher than normal duty to press ethical boundaries to the
limits when that is in the interests of their clients. If
disciplinary agencies are extending the same reasoning to
prosecutors, they probably are concluding either that
aggressive defense lawyer conduct justifies reciprocation
by prosecutors or that alternative remedies, such as judicial
supervision, are adequate to discourage prosecutorial
misconduct.
214
If this observation is correct, then the failure in the system
of professional discipline lies in the perception that prosecutors'
liability for Brady violations should be excused because they are
forced to litigate against defense counsel, who are ethically
charged with the duty to aggressively represent their clients.
This may reflect an unfortunate view of fairness in which
constitutional rights of the accused are balanced against the
general need for effective prosecution, disregarding both the
incredible disparity in resources enjoyed by the State in criminal
litigation and the express need to offset this advantage with
procedural rights dedicated only to the accused in amendments
to the Constitution.
VII. EPILOGUE
The authority given to the State in prosecuting the
individual accused is awesome, to use a routinely overused
word, and it can only be used fairly if the individuals charged
with exercising the power to prosecute are subject to restraint by
constitutional protections and ethical rules that address the
relative disadvantages suffered by the accused. Justice Byron
White explained defense counsel's ethical duties toward the
client in the American criminal justice system in his separate
opinion in United States v. Wade:
Law enforcement officers have the obligation to
convict the guilty and to make sure they do not convict the
innocent. They must be dedicated to making the criminal
trial a procedure for the ascertainment of the true facts
surrounding the commission of the crime. To this extent,
our so-called adversary system is not adversary at all; nor
214. Id.
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should it be. But defense counsel has no comparable
obligation to ascertain or present the truth. Our system
assigns him a different mission. He must be and is
interested in preventing the conviction of the innocent, but,
absent a voluntary plea of guilty, we also insist that he
defend his client whether he is innocent or guilty. The
State has the obligation to present the evidence. Defense
counsel need present nothing, even if he knows what the
truth is. He need not furnish any witnesses to the police, or
reveal any confidences of his client, or furnish any other
information to help the prosecution's case. If he can
confuse a witness, even a truthful one, or make him appear
at a disadvantage, unsure or indecisive, that will be his
normal course. Our interest in not convicting the innocent
permits counsel to put the State to its proof, to put the
State's case in the worst possible light, regardless of what
he thinks or knows to be the truth. Undoubtedly there are
some limits which defense counsel must observe but more
often than not, defense counsel will cross-examine a
prosecution witness, and impeach him if he can, even if he
thinks the witness is telling the truth, just as he will attempt
to destroy a witness who he thinks is lying. In this respect,
as part of our modified adversary system and as part of the
duty imposed on the most honorable defense counsel, we
countenance or require conduct which in many instances
has little, if any, relation to the search for truth.2'
In the system described by Justice White, there must exist
checks and balances to ensure that the constitutional protections
expressly afforded individual criminal defendants are neither
hollow, nor dependent upon the resources available to the
accused in the individual case.216 The right to be tried fairly on
the evidence requires that the defendant be afforded access to
that evidence which is favorable to him and which may have
been developed by the State in its investigation of the case.
Following the denial of Billy Dale Green's motion for
double jeopardy relief by the Arkansas Supreme Court,217 Chad
Green refused to testify against his father at the retrial ordered
by the court in reversing the capital convictions.218 The
215. 388 U.S. 218, 256-58 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part).
216. Id.
217. Green II, 2011 Ark. 92, at 1,380 S.W.3d 368, 369.
218. Green v. State, 2012 Ark. 347, at 2,423 S.W.3d 62, 65.
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prosecutor revoked the agreement for Chad's testimony 219 that
had resulted in a reduced sentence of forty years on one count of
capital murder to run concurrently with sentences imposed on
three other felony counts.22 ° Chad Green lost the benefit of his
agreement-a reduced, twenty-year sentence-and was
subsequently tried and convicted on all four counts of capital
murder.221 He was sentenced to serve life sentences on all four
capital counts, plus forty years on the kidnapping count.
222
Billy Dale Green's conviction on all counts at the retrial,
resulting in mandatory imposition of life sentences on the capital
223murder counts, may actually demonstrate that the State never
needed to rely on Chad Green as a witness in the first capital
trial. For some, the fact of his conviction will undoubtedly serve
to reinforce the inappropriate conclusion that constitutional
protections are only available for the truly innocent, and that
upon proof of guilt, violation of the accused's rights merits no
consideration. For those holding that view, the fact that there
has been no censure of the prosecutors for their misconduct in
failing to disclose evidence favorable to Billy Dale Green's
counsel prior to his first trial is wholly consistent with their
position that his guilt, now found by two capital juries,
implicitly absolved the prosecutors of any failure to carry out
their duties consistently with federal constitutional law, and the
disclosure obligations imposed under Arkansas law and the
Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure.
As for the prosecutors themselves, the deputy involved in
the case died following the trial of Chad Green. Prosecuting
Attorney Henry Boyce, the lead prosecutor in the Green cases,
was honored by Arkansas prosecutors for his work in the cases,
as a local news outlet reported:
219. The revocation of the negotiated agreement was upheld by the Arkansas
Supreme Court in Green v. State, 2009 Ark. 113, at 11, 313 S.W.3d 521, 523.
220. Green, 2012 Ark. 347, at 2,423 S.W.3d at 65.
221. Id. at 1-2, 423 S.W.3d 62, 64-65.
222. Id. at 1, 423 S.W.3d at 64.
223. Green III, 2013 Ark. 497, at 1, 430 S.W.3d 729, 734. The court noted that
Chad Green did not testify in the retrial of his father on the capital murder charges. Id. at
2, 430 S.W.3d at 735.
224. Randolph County Man Given Four Life Terms, AREA WIDE NEWS (Sept. 19,
2011), http://www.areawidenews.com/story/1764644.html [http://perma.cc/RG7W-CW69];
Obituaries & Records: Richard L. Castleman, POCAHONTAS STAR HERALD, Dec. 8, 2011,
at I0A.
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The Arkansas Prosecuting Attorneys Association, in
conjunction with Henderson State University, awarded the
Sidney S. McMath Sword of Justice Award in Hot Springs
recently. The award is presented to one prosecutor every
two years for his efforts to promote justice and fulfill the
goals of the Association. Third Judicial District
Prosecuting Attorney and Association President, Henry H.
Boyce, of Newport was presented the honor. Boyce told
the Hill 'n Holler Review that he couldn't be more honored
by his selection. He added that there could be no greater
honor than to be recognized by his peers. Boyce has
conducted the prolonged prosecution of accused Randolph
County killers of a Dalton, Ark., family of four who were
found brutally murdered in 1998. The son, Chad Green,
was convicted on four counts of murder this August and
sentenced to four consecutive life sentences plus 40 years
for kidnapping. The father, Billy Green, will stand trial
next April for the murders. Boyce will seek the death
penalty.2 25
To date, there is no record that Prosecuting Attorney Henry
Boyce ever received any discipline for the Brady violation.
Sidney S. McMath, an outstanding trial lawyer and former
Arkansas Governor, was highly regarded as a progressive
reformer during his long history of public service in the state.
226
Honoring a prosecutor who admittedly violated the rights of a
capital defendant seems cynical and hardly consistent with
Governor McMath's legacy. It also betrays a flaw in Arkansas
courts' enforcement of constitutional protections.2 2 7
225. Prosecuting Attorneys Honor Henry Boyce with Sword of Justice Award, HILL
'N HOLLER REV. (Nov. 14, 2011), http://hillnholler.net/2011/11/14/prosecuting-attorneys-
honor-henry-boyce-with-sword-of-justice-award/ [http://perma.cc/8B9N-8NC7].
226. See C. Fred Williams, Sid McMath (1912-2003), ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARK.
HISTORY & CULTURE, http://www.encyclopediaofarkansas.net/encyclopedia/entry-
detail.aspx?entrylD=5 1 [http://perma.cc/N9VvV-LKQC] (last updated Oct. 22, 2014).
227. See Mara Leveritt, Prosecutors Have All the Power but Little Oversight. Is a
Violation Not a Violation if a Prosecutor Says, 'I Didn 't Mean To'?, ARK. TIMES, Sept. 11,
2014, at 14, 15-17. While the Office of Professional Conduct has reported lawyer
sanctions since the suspension of President Bill Clinton's Arkansas law license in 1992-a
list comprised of nearly 750 published sanctions-Leveritt did not find a single prosecutor
whose name she could recall included on that list. Id. Leveritt is a long-time Arkansas
political reporter best known for her work in support of the defendants in the West
Memphis murder case-the West Memphis Three. See Max Brantley, Make That Dr.
Mara Leveritt: UALR Honors a Famous Grad, ARK. BLOG (May 17, 2014, 7:53 PM),
http://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2014/05/17/make-that-dr-mara-leveritt-
ualr-honors-a-famous-grad [http://perma.cc/FB2H-6T8B].
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